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ABSTRACT 
The majority of the doctrine currently published by the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command intended to guide operators in conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
focuses overwhelmingly on training and employing a “guerrilla force.” But how are these 
guerrillas recruited and, once enlisted, how are they equipped, paid, and sustained? The 
answer for successful guerrilla movements in the past has been a well organized 
resistance underground. In this thesis I will examine the underground movements that 
provided UW resistance fighters during two wars; the three underground movements in 
the Philippines that continued to fight Japan between MacArthur’s hasty departure and 
triumphant return and the resistance movement in South Vietnam that vexed American 
forces between the partitioning of the country in 1954 until the U.S. departure in 1974.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most important guiding principle for our early activities was armed 
propaganda [by armed units] ...political activities were more important 
than military activities. Fighting was less important than agit-prop work. 
Armed activities were used to safeguard, consolidate, and develop the 
political bases.  
—Vo Nguyen Giap 
A. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The majority of the doctrine currently published by the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) intended to guide operators in conducting 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) focuses overwhelmingly on training and employing a 
“guerrilla force.”1 But how are these guerrillas recruited and, once enlisted, how are they 
equipped, paid, and sustained? The answer for successful guerrilla movements in the past 
has been a well organized resistance underground. In this thesis, I will examine the 
underground movements that provided UW resistance fighters during two wars; the three 
underground movements in the Philippines that continued to fight Japan between 
MacArthur’s hasty departure and triumphant return and the resistance movement in South 
Vietnam that vexed counterinsurgent forces between the partitioning of the country in 
1954 until the U.S. departure in 1973.  
A literature review demonstrates a range of substantive guidance in 
unconventional warfare doctrine in the development of an underground. History offers a 
depth of work regarding successful underground movements, and in some cases specific 
doctrine and regulations for the establishment of cells and committees. Social science 
also offers substantive analysis of resource and population mobilization as well as 
analysis of successful organizational practices in underground movements. This thesis 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18–01 Special 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008). See also Field 
Manual 3–05.130 Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2008). 
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proposes to help bridge the gap between doctrine and academia by reviewing the role of 
the underground movements in these two conflicts.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
I will begin with a review of U.S. Army doctrine in the development of an 
underground, from the inception of USASOC until present. The thesis will then move on 
to a brief review of the body of literature concerning the underground, followed by a 
review of social movement theory. The intent behind this review is to develop a 
theoretical foundation from which to add or subtract practices and theory, as the research 
indicates. 
I will then review two historical case studies: the National Liberation Front in 
South Vietnam from its creation by the communist party of North Vietnam in 1960 until 
the Tet offensive in 1968, and the resistance movement in the Philippines from 
approximately 1942 until the U.S. and Philippine re-conquest of the islands in 1945.  
Finally, I will present a synthesis of organizational and operational practices in 
the development of an underground with a recommendation for structure and planning. 
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II. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE 
COMPARED AND CONTRASTED WITH CLASSIC AND MODERN 
SOURCES, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
This chapter will first review current U.S. doctrine in Unconventional Warfare 
(UW) for potential strengths and weaknesses in the organization, sustainment, and 
employment of underground movements. It will then compare those shortfalls with 
notable works by unconventional warriors such as Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and 
Vladimir Lenin, as well as the work of social movement theory thinkers, such as Doug 
McAdam and Sydney Tarrow. The current doctrine underspecifies the role and 
importance of mass organizations and security and recruitment in underground 
organizations. Social movement theory offers a conceptual framework for how to build 
resistance networks in authoritarian regimes or under foreign occupation that may 
supplement the missing pieces in doctrine. This chapter will conclude by proposing three 
essential tasks to be performed, across five phases of underground activity.  
A. CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINE 
Current, published UW doctrine is encompassed in Field Manual (FM) 3–05–130, 
Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, and Training Circular (TC) 
18–01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare. Both works are largely derivative of 
Andrew Molnar’s work.2 Both the FM and the TC draw heavily from Molnar’s work in 
an attempt to make a large field of research manageable for the military professional. 
However, both inadequately capture the conclusions of the original research. The 
differences between the two lie in their respective fundamental approaches to 
unconventional warfare. Whereas Molnar focuses on the development of the underground 
prior to the emergence of a guerrilla force, current doctrine assumes the existence of a 
guerrilla force and focuses on that element as the primary vehicle for unconventional 
warfare. In doing so, doctrine provides only a cursory examination of underground 
                                                 
2 Andrew Molnar’s first work, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies is an 
expansion of his earlier work, Undergrounds in Insurgency, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. 
Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies was published in 1966 as Department of 
the Army Pamphlet No. 550–104, since superseded by the current TC 18–01 and FM 3–05–130. 
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functions such as operational cells and shadow governments in order to focus more fully 
on the guerrilla.3 This chapter will briefly review the two manuals, underground theory, 
and social movement theory. Ultimately this review will suggest a more complete review 
of the organization and functions of the underground in a resistance movement.  
1. Definitions 
In arriving at a common operational guideline, a set of criteria defining the 
underground is necessary. Molnar defines the underground as “those clandestine or 
covert organizational elements of a subversive or insurgent movement which are 
attempting to weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority.”4 Historically, 
the U.S. military has conducted UW alongside partisans or guerrillas in countries 
occupied by enemy states,5 as purposeful underground provocateurs in enemy territory,6 
and as organizers of underground subversion in other states.7 It is the latter that this work 
will focus upon. In doing so, definitions for UW and the underground will be covered.  
a. Unconventional Warfare 
The 10th Special Forces Group was formed in 1952 and drew from the 
Jedburgh and OSS experiences in Europe during the Second World War.8 The Special 
                                                 
3 A specific example of this is Figure 2–2. Structure of an Insurgency or Resistance Movement on 
page 2–4 of TC 18–01. The figure depicts the functions of the underground as actions supporting large and 
minor guerrilla actions. This figure is a maladaptive reprisal of Molnar’s Figure 1–1. Covert and Overt 
Functions of the Underground on page 6 of Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies, which simply delineates between clandestine and overt activities without placing an emphasis 
on any one function. The effect of the TC’s version of the figure is to place primacy on guerrilla action as 
the ultimate output of unconventional warfare. The focus on the guerrilla in unconventional warfare is 
counterproductive in the context of Admiral Olson’s definition as the first two effects of unconventional 
warfare activities, coerce and disrupt, do not necessarily require a guerrilla force to emerge. 
4 Andrew Molnar, Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 1. 
5 R. W.Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New 
York: WW Norton & Company, 1954). 
6 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 27–51. 
7 Kermit Roosevelt, Counter Coup: the Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1979). 
8 Thomas K. Adams, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare,” (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 54–55. 
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Forces Group was initially intended to be a covert force for developing and employing 
anti-Soviet resistance in Eastern Europe, in the event of war.9 Throughout Vietnam and 
the Cold War both the definitions and associated tasks have changed to place emphasis 
on various combinations of tasks from raids10 to advisory missions.11 Currently, Special 
Operations Command is functioning under the definition from Admiral Olson’s UW 
working group: 
Activities conducted to enable resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in 
a denied area.12  
The focus that doctrine places on the guerrilla in unconventional warfare 
is counterproductive in the context of Admiral Olson’s definition as the first two effects 
of unconventional warfare activities, coerce and disrupt, do not necessarily require a 
guerrilla force to emerge. Rather than place emphasis on the guerrilla, unconventional 
warfare needs would be better met with a sponsor-centric, mission-specific force team 
that is indigenous movement oriented.  
b. The Underground 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) doctrine defines the underground as an 
organization that operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force, or conducts operations 
not suitable for guerrilla forces.13 The definition includes the guerrilla force without 
specifying a role for the underground when in fact the guerrilla force need not emerge at 
all to accomplish coercion or disruption. The definition disregards Mao’s writings on the 
                                                 
9 Thomas K. Adams, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare,” (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 54. 
 10 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)136. 
11 Cecil E. Bailey, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador,” in Special Warfare , 
December 2004.  
12 UW Definition Working Group Out-brief, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School. April 9, 2009. Admiral Olson added to the definition by asserting that UW was bigger “…that UW 
is bigger than SOF and bigger than DoD. Other agencies of government also perform many ‘activities’ of 
UW.” 
13 Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18–01 Special 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), Glossary-4. 
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necessity of organizing the “sea,”14 and suggests that the underground is a secondary 
effort. In Basic Tactics, Mao does not specifically define the underground, rather assigns 
the guerrilla leader and political officer the task of mobilizing the people into 
associations, professional organizations, and “resist-the-enemy” associations for the 
purpose of supplementing guerrilla capacity.15 Vo Nguyen Giap was more specific in 
defining the political force as the organization of workers and peasants that was the 
mainstay of the political war in the denied area. He further describes this force as the 
basis for the emergence of the revolutionary forces.16 In Giap’s description, once the 
underground is developed then the guerrilla emerges. Molnar’s definition combines the 
two, and will be used in this thesis: 
An underground is defined as those clandestine or covert organizational 
elements of a subversive or insurgent movement which are attempting to 
weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority.17 
Current doctrine describes the underground as one of three parts to the 
resistance or insurgency which includes the auxiliary and the guerrilla force. Many 
successful resistance movements suggest that the underground is the initial organization 
from which later organizations are formed.18  
Put differently, the underground is arguably the mainstay of resistance. It 
is inherently self-sustaining as it is comprised of the local people in a given area. It is 
capable of drawing on all elements of the population, for what they have to offer. The 
                                                 
14 Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (Griffith translation, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), 66. “The guerrilla must move among the people as a fish swims in the sea.”  
15 Ibid., 55–56. 
16 Vo Nguyen Giap, Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 238–240. 
17 Andrew Molnar, Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 17. 
18 Examples of this include the development of the National Socialist Party in Germany through the 
1920s and 1930s, and the Polish Catholic resistance movements from the 1950s through the Solidarity 
movement, discussed in chapters three and four in Social Movements and Networks (2003). In Chapter one 
of Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (2004), Hafez discusses the migration of 
portions of the Islamic Salvation Front  to the radical Armed Islamic Group. In chapters three and four of 
Poor People’s Movements: Why they Succeed and How they Fail (1979), Piven and Cloward discuss many 
examples of workers and minorities organizing clandestinely as a precursor to organized political 
contention. In RAND publication Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
(1993), McCormick discusses the development of cadre and the underground prior the emergence of the 
guerrilla. 
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underground can work through overt as well as covert organizations to gain support for 
the movement, and is capable of infiltrating existing institutions of government for the 
purpose of subversion. When the opportunity to create a guerrilla force presents itself, the 
guerrilla force will emerge from, be supported by, and fed intelligence through the 
underground.19 
2. Seven Phases 
Current UW doctrine offers a “seven phased” approach to operational planning: 
preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build up, employment, and 
transition.20 However, the UW phases discussed in current doctrine generally 
underspecify the importance of how to organize the underground. Therefore, I rely on 
three notable irregular warfare thinkers, Lenin, Mao, and Giap, to synthesize a more 
underground centric approach to UW planning. 
Lenin’s work preceded both Mao’s and Giap’s, and is more focused on the 
political education of the workers and subsequent violent revolution. His interpretation of 
Marx and Engles led him to advocate, “By educating the workers party, Marxism 
educates the vanguard of the proletariat…”21 the idea being that by raising political 
consciousness, workers would be able to look past “narrow trade union interests” and 
take control of state production capability, causing the state to “wither away” from lack 
of purpose.22 By directing ‘ “Social Democrats”‘ to educate themselves as revolutionary 
vanguards, Lenin sought to send out the intelligentsia as a vanguard, or cadre, to raise the 
political consciousness of the proletariat. The demonstrations and strikes of the working 
                                                 
19 Andrew R. Molnar, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare 
(Washington, DC: American University, 1963), 40. 
20 Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18–01 Special 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1–9. 
21 Vladimir Lenin, State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the 
Proletariat in the Revolution (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), Kindle 
edition, location 350. 
22 Ibid., 289–318. 
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class will only be successful, argues Lenin, if the workers are given political education 
and led by this vanguard.23  
Organizationally, Lenin advocated that the vanguard infiltrate other labor and 
mass organizations that may not be strictly socialist, gain control through covert 
membership, and manipulate those organizations through the use of united fronts against 
the state.24 Mao and Giap agree with Lenin in the application of guerrilla warfare; that it 
is an inevitable phase in an insurgency, that it must be controlled and disciplined to avoid 
hurting the people, and that it should be replaced with conventional fighting when 
possible.25  
Mao Tse Tung’s On Guerrilla Warfare was less concerned with phases of 
operation, and more concerned with the development of national unity in opposition to 
Imperial Japan.26 To that end, he discussed the guerrilla force in two different manners. 
First, purely military aspects of guerrilla operations would grow into a regular force. The 
regular, mobile army would eventually produce victory, and the guerrilla operations 
would assist them in doing so.27 Second, the guerrilla effort was inherently political. 
“Without a political goal,” writes Mao, “guerrilla warfare must fail.”28The political goal 
of the guerrilla must be compatible with the goals and desires of the people, in order to 
gain their participation in the guerrilla effort.29  
In developing the political war, Mao assigned three fundamental tasks. First, there 
must be spiritual unification between the officers and the men, and then between the 
army and the people. By contrast, the unification of the enemy forces must be 
                                                 
23 Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be Done” in V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901 – 
February 1902 (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 347. 
24 Vladimir Lenin, “‘Left Wing Communism’– an Infantile Disorder” in V. I. Lenin: Collected Works 
Volume 31, April – December 1920 (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1966), 17. 
25 Vladimir Lenin, “Guerrilla Warfare” in V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 11, June 1906 – 
January 1907 (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), 213. 
26 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 42–43. 
27 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 56. 
28 Ibid., 43. 
29 Ibid. 
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destroyed.30 In this model for political war, the officers undertake to educate the soldiers 
in the political aspects of the war. The guerrilla cannot be against the Japanese because he 
is in the militia; he must be in the militia because he is anti-Japanese.31With that level of 
political conviction, the soldiers will be disciplined by strength of conviction rather than 
fear of punishment. The army then must undertake to spread the same political conviction 
among the people through education and disciplined behavior. In this manner, the “sea” 
of the people becomes hospital to the “fish,” or guerrilla.32  
Vo Nguyen Giap’s resistance theory is an application of Lenin’s work to his 
situation and goals in Vietnam. This was an expansion of Ho Chi Minh’s The Road to 
Revolution, which applied Lenin’s writings to the problem of colonialism in Asia, with 
emphasis placed on the peasant farmer rather than the proletariat.33 Giap focuses more 
attention on building unity among the people to create mass organizations, and has two 
additional phases of psychological preparation compared to Mao’s three, prefacing 
organization with varying degrees of psychological preparation of the people and 
organizing people into “mass organizations” before admitting them into “the party.”34  
From the above discussion, we can present Molnar’s five phases of revolution as a 
synthesis of Lenin, Mao, and Vo Nguyen Giap’s various principles of underground 
mobilization:  
1. Clandestine organization 
2. Psychological offensive 
3. Expansion  
4. Militarization 
5. Consolidation  
 
                                                 
30 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 90. 
31 Ibid., 88–89. 
32 Ibid., 90–93 
33 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1981), 16–21. 
34 Vo Nguyen Giap, Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 238–240. 
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The above framework suggests three essential tasks to build and sustain 
underground organizations: establishing a professional cadre, the establishment and 
operation of covert cells, and the development of mass organizations. These three tasks 
will be further developed by drawing upon by drawing key concepts from social 
movement theory and synthesizing the two. 
B. THREE TASKS 
1. Establishing a Cadre 
Lenin argues was that spontaneous demonstrations and strikes were not sufficient 
to bring about change on their own, that the mass of workers were not capable of 
achieving class consciousness from within, and would need it brought to them from 
without. “The principle thing, of course,” argues Lenin, “is propaganda and agitation 
among all strata of the people.”35 The need for a trained cadre to agitate among the 
masses was recognized and adopted by Giap36 and the Shining Path’s Abimael 
Guzman37 in their programs for training cadre prior to sending them to agitate among the 
people. In an underground, the selection and education of a cadre in the subversive 
doctrine becomes necessary before further development can be achieved.  
The cadre must be trained to target the masses with a specific application of the 
resistance narrative, as it applies to them: 
We should go to the masses and learn from them, synthesize their 
experience into better, articulated principles and methods, then do 
propaganda among the masses, and call upon them to put these principles 
and methods into practice so as to solve their problems and help them 
achieve liberation and happiness.38 
                                                 
35 Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be Done” in V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901 – 
February 1902 (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 422–425. 
36 Vo Nguyen Giap, Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 224. 
37 Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Times Books, 1992), 3–23. 
38 Mao Tse-Tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung (Peking, China: Foreign Languages 
Press, Second Edition, 1966), Kindle edition, location 1179. From “Get Organized!” (November 29, 1943) 
Selected Works, Vol III, 158.  
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By “going among the masses” the operator is able to conduct a census of local 
grievances, and incorporate it into the resistance narrative. This enables the underground 
to “do propaganda among the masses” in a manner that resonates with the targeted 
demographic. A narrative with strong resonance will increase the likelihood that the 
population will respond to the underground’s call to action. 
In developing the “experiences of the masses” into a subversive doctrine, Snow 
and Benford’s three core framing tasks provide a comprehensive framework to identify 
essential components of narrative.39 The first task is diagnostic framing, in which the 
narrative should assign blame for a particular problem or problems to a specific actor or 
actors.40 The second task is prognostic framing, in which a strategy for addressing the 
problem is laid out.41 Lastly, the motivational frame should issue a call to arms in which 
the target audience is called upon to take action.42 A narrative successfully framed in this 
manner should have a degree of mobilizing effect among the desired population when it 
is central to the belief system of the target audience.43 A low degree of centrality can be 
mitigated by broadening the range of the frame to include other items within the belief 
system of the audience.44 A broad list of interrelated items within the belief system, and a 
master frame that has high centrality should result in a frame with high resonance among 
the target audience.45  
When cadres have been trained in how to formulate a resistance narrative, they 
must be dispersed into different communities to establish an underground. Cadres, as 
individual activists or in small groups, are what Helmut Anheier referred to as movement 
entrepreneurs. A movement entrepreneur’s goal is to establish, expand, and ultimately 
                                                 
39 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 199. 
40 Ibid., 200. 
41 Ibid., 201. 
42 Ibid., 201–201. 
43 Ibid., 205. 
44 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 205–206. 
45 Ibid., 206–207. 
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maximize movement operations at his or her level.46 In the case discussed by Anheier, 
single members of the National Socialist Party in Germany went to communities without 
party chapters, and embedded themselves in existing social networks and organizations. 
Embeddedness in this sense is the degree to which cadre can infiltrate existing social 
networks in a given community. Cadre embedded in this way enjoy a degree of influence 
within the community that corresponds to the degree they are embedded. 47 
Similarly, Lenin proposed that the social democrats leave their study circles and 
go out “… among all classes of the population” as theoreticians, as propagandists, as 
agitators, and as organizers.”48   Cadre dispersed and embedded in this fashion can begin 
developing trust based relationships and locally dense network structures.49  Trust based 
relationships will enable the cadre member to align the frame of the underground to the 
local target audience more effectively, and will give him greater credibility. Locally 
dense networks will allow the cadre member to connect his network hub with those of 
other cadres, creating structures for greater resource mobilization.50 
2. Cells and Security 
The basic unit of the underground is the cell, it typically has three to five 
members, and performs one of four functions: operations, intelligence, recruiting and 
vetting, and manufactory.51 Operational cells perform specific underground functions, 
such as delivering propaganda, facilitating contentious politics, terrorism, collecting 
                                                 
46 Anheier, Helmut “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single 
Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.”  In Social Movements and Networks, ed. Mario Diani 
and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53. 
47 Anheier, Helmut “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single 
Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.”  In Social Movements and Networks, edited by Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–71. 
48 Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be Done” in V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901–
February 1902 (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 422–425. 
49 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished 
draft, forthcoming in Special Warfare Magazine 26 (2013). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Andrew Molnar, Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 6–14. 
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money, or political warfare tasks.52 In The Theory of Unconventional Warfare: Win, 
Lose, and Draw, authors Diver and DeFeyter conclude that in the beginning of 
developing an insurgency the focus is on maintaining security and using mobilizing 
structures to expand the organization.53 Security at this stage of organization is 
maintained by creating layers of compartmentalized cells that control information.54 
Security can be enhanced by establishing cells within pre-existing trust-based 
networks. Mobilizing structures are “formal and informal collective vehicles through 
which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”55 These structures can be 
informal or formal networks through which regular affairs are conducted, or structures 
created for a specific purpose.56 Cells within existing social networks can utilize trust-
based relations such as friendship or kinship, lowering the cost of mobilization, and 
facilitating expansion.57 Interpersonal relations between networks also facilitates 
resource mobilization, particularly in areas experiencing a great degree of state imposed 
order, or repression. According to Osa, in closed regimes social networks provide 
information about the conduct of illicit activity; what official can be bribed, for instance. 
Because of this sort of situation, social networks function as both “media” and 
mobilization organization.58 By using pre-existing social networks this way, movement 
entrepreneurs can lower the information and transaction cost of resource mobilization. 
                                                 
52 Andrew Molnar, Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 6–14. 
53 William “Dave” Driver and Bruce E. DeFeyter The Theory of Unconventional Warfare: Win, Lose, 
and Draw (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2008), 13. The authors cite Doug McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald, 
(2008), 3. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished 
draft, forthcoming in Special Warfare Magazine 26 (2013). 
56 Sydney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 157–169. 
57 Helmut Anheier, “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single 
Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In Social Movements and Networks, edited by Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53. 
58 Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish 
People’s Republic.”  In Social Movements and Networks, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104. 
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They can also maximize participation by manipulating the same social networks for event 
turn-out.59  
As cadres expand network clusters and form cells, security is enhanced by 
reducing risk to the individual. Risk is reduced by diffusing the tasks that make up a 
given illicit activity among the members of a network of cells. This also contributes to the 
development of a collective identity as members share in the risk of the illicit activity.60 
3. Mass Organizations, Social Networks, and Buffering 
Lenin proposes that the use of mass organizations would increase subversive 
activity and decrease risk to the individual.61 Further, the mass organizations act as a 
legal auxiliary cell so that citizens not yet ready for subversive work or party membership 
might be included in the insurgency or at the very least prevented from supporting the 
state. As members of the mass organization are gradually involved in increasingly illicit 
or subversive activities, they are identified by cadre members and moved deeper into the 
underground. In this sense, the mass organization has a “transmission belt” function that 
recruits potential underground cadre. 62 
In establishing security for itself, the overt branch of the underground has two key 
tasks: taking on buffering organizations that can be used to absorb repression, and 
sustaining itself with popular support and new members. Buffer organizations are those 
                                                 
59 Helmut Anheier “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single 
Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.”  In Social Movements and Networks, edited by Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–54. 
60 Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish 
People’s Republic.”  In Social Movements and Networks, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 78–79. While risk rises in correlation to activity, the risk to the 
individual is reduced as illicit workload is spread. 
61 Michael Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of 
Organization and Strategy, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American 
University, 1966), 77–79. 
62 Michael Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of 
Organization and Strategy, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American 
University, 1966), 224. 
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social or political networks that attract the attention and resources of the state away from 
more mainstream groups.63  
Coalitions of organizations may be created from existing groups, when 
ideologically neutral groups act as brokers between groups with conflicting ideologies. 
An example of this is the radical youth and nationalist groups in Poland from 1976 to 
1981. Groups with greatly differing ideologies were able to coalesce over civic action 
oriented groups, developing a focus on humanitarianism in the center of the organization. 
This allowed the liberal left and conservative right, as well as radical youth and 
nationalists, to work together. Being the most threatening, the radical youth and 
nationalists groups attracted government repression, moving it away from the main 
resistance network.64 
Attracting buffer organizations and generating new membership is done by 
creating an increase in public support for the underground. In the RAND study 
Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, the authors 
demonstrate how effectively insurgencies generate public support. In the study, 
organization effectiveness has several subfactors: leadership, ideological packaging, 
presence of leadership and the ability of the organization to take action and mobilize 
resources.65 These subfactors can be a guide to the movement entrepreneur at the 
community level in many ways, primarily in that the continuous presence of cadre at the 
community level is critical. First, the presence of cadre members in the community 
allows the narrative of resistance to be packaged with the local population in mind. 
Second, cadre can take advantage of opportunities for resource mobilization or political 
contention. Third, community level cadre can tailor underground action and development 
to local conditions, such as the presence or absence of state security forces. 
                                                 
63 Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish 
People’s Republic.”  In Social Movements and Networks, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.), 101. 
64 Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish 
People’s Republic.”  In Social Movements and Networks, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.), 101. 
65 Paul K. Davis et al., Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 25–28. 
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Cadres that are embedded in social networks can conduct bloc recruiting during 
the execution of the third task. Embedded cadre use trust relationships to recruit or 
convert existing organizations into the underground. The recruited organization brings 
with it resources and behavioral norms that members are socialized to and transfer them 
to the underground organization. This allows the underground organization to appear as 
though it had always been a part of local civil society.66 The advantage to bloc recruiting 
is convincing key communicators or decision makers within an organization to advocate 
for the movement, and organize portions of the population on its behalf. In the case of the 
network, the individual brings an entire group of people. Cialdini observed that when in 
doubt people look to the group or community as a whole for a model of correct behavior. 
The principle of “social proof,” as he calls it has the potential to offer other organizations 
an opportunity to participate simply because “everyone is doing it.”67  
When mass organizations are formed, it becomes necessary to take some small 
actions in order to establish the movement’s credibility and facilitate recruitment. In 
Power in Movement, Sydney Tarrow discusses three broad types of collective action in 
contentious politics: disruption, violence, and contained behavior.68 These three 
categories offer the practitioner a variety of techniques on a scale that starts with articles 
and posters, and ends with purposeful violence against targets chosen for psychological 
reasons. The less violent end of the scale will attract the political activist and mobilize the 
less radicalized segments of the population and is appropriate for the when coercion is 
desired.69 Purposeful violence will pit the movement against the state’s ability to impose 
order and will cause the less radical to drift away, leaving the true believers to embrace 
                                                 
66 Helmut Anheier “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single 
Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In Social Movements and Networks, edited by Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 52–53. 
67 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
1984). 
68 Sidney G Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95. 
69 Ibid., 103–104. 
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increasingly radical tactics.70  This is appropriate when overthrow is desired. A repertoire 
of creative disruption and contained behavior that goes beyond leaflets but is limited to 
protests and scuffles is likely to be the optimal level of action for sustained growth of the 
organization.71 
Returning to Molnar’s phasing for the underground, the three essential tasks take 
place primarily in the first three phases. In the fourth and fifth phases, the emergence of 
the guerrilla force is expected. Recruiting and preparing a professional cadre occurs in the 
organizational phase. The establishment and operation of covert cells occurs in the 
psychological offensive phase, and the development of mass organizations occurs in the 
expansion phase. The application of these phases do not need to be uniform across 
different geographical areas, and may regress from later to phase to an earlier phase 
dependent upon the state’s ability to impose order or otherwise repress the underground. 
C. FIVE PHASES 
1. Organization 
In the organizational phase, four items or events should occur. First, a census72 of 
the area should be taken. Second, the creation of a subversive doctrine based on the 
census should be created. Third, a carefully vetted, indigenous cadre should be recruited 
and given training in the subversive doctrine. Fourth, the cadre should be infiltrated into 
communities.  
                                                 
70 Mohammed M. Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres: A political Process Explanation of 
GIA Violence in Algeria” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 40–41. In a review of the experience of 
the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Hafez notes that groups become increasingly exclusive in order to 
shield themselves from government repression. As groups become increasingly exclusive, there is 
possibility for an echo chamber effect, in which honest self-appraisal of the group becomes less likely. In 
the case of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria the reliance on “brothers” in the group for evaluation of the 
groups purpose led to increasingly violent action against the civilian population that formerly supported 
them. 
71 Sidney G Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95–118. 
72 A complete census of an operational area would include segments of the population vulnerable to 
mobilization, segments of the population that have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, local 
grievances, and existing networks and organizations. The Viet Cong employed village survey team to 
assess the geographical situation, the enemy situation, the mass, or social, situation, and the strength of 
party members. for example. Andrews, William R. The Village War (Colombia, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 1973), 45. 
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A census of the area of operations should reveal a list of existing organizations 
and social networks, as well as an understanding of local grievances. This should also 
give the operator an idea of what networks might be subject to infiltration. Using the 
census, a subversive doctrine should be created that has high resonance among the largest 
population that is susceptible to mobilization. Members of the targeted segment of the 
population should be vetted, revealing possible candidates for recruitment as cadre. Once 
recruited, cadre members should be indoctrinated. Once trained, cadre members should 
be sent to infiltrate existing social or political organizations. When cadre members have 
been successfully integrated into existing networks, the psychological offensive should 
begin. 
2. Psychological Offensive 
During the psychological offensive three events must occur continuously. First, 
the embedded cadre member begins recruiting for the underground. Second, cadre 
members in different communities should begin to connect their networks. Third, the 
subversive doctrine should be socialized, with varying degrees of intensity. 
When the embedded cadre member begins initial recruitment, it is on an 
interpersonal level and based on trust relationships. The underground is at its most 
vulnerable in this phase and security is preferred over recruitment. As possible the cadre 
should recruit underground members and place them into cells. Cells should be 
compartmentalized, and identities of members known by as few people as possible, for as 
long as the size of the organization permits. The subversive doctrine should be socialized 
in a manner that allows the underground to expand but not so much that it attracts state 
repression. The psychological offensive should transition when cells have expanded to a 
point that they can accommodate an auxiliary and facilitate contentious politics.  
3. Expansion 
In this phase, the underground should develop a mass organization that can take 
on part time members. Part-time members should be led in an appropriate level of 
political contention in order to develop public support and thereby gain new members 
and greater notoriety as an organization in opposition to the regime. As the organization 
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develops public support the underground should begin coordinating with other political 
and social networks to expand opposition into a united front.  
The underground cadre should be monitoring part time members for potential 
recruitment into the underground. Potential recruits should be gradually given 
increasingly subversive or illicit tasks to bring them deeper into the underground. When 
potential recruits are sufficiently engaged in underground activities, the organization 
should function as a transmission belt and move them deeper into the underground. 
As united mass organizations receive more state attention and new members of 
the underground are recruited, cells should expand into new areas and organizations. New 
organizations should include cadre infiltration of other organizations in the united front. 
This phase should end as the local underground cadre gain a measure of control over 
other organizations in the united front. 
4. Militarization 
A guerrilla force is formed in this phase, following Mao’s theory of strategy in 
protracted warfare. The guerrilla force is initially defensive, focused on harassment and 
building force until increasingly ambitious strategies may be realistically followed.73The 
underground supports the development of guerrilla warfare by recruiting members 
through the mass organizations and moving them on to the guerrilla force. Operational 
cells support the guerrilla force through sabotage in key infrastructure, raiding for or 
purchasing supplies and establishing caches. Manufactory cells are established in this 
phase in order to produce necessary items in short supply. Logistical support to guerrilla 
operations comes from local underground cells.74 This phase should end when projecting 
force into the guerrilla’s area becomes excessively costly for the state. 
                                                 
73 Mao Tse Tung, “On Protracted War,” in On Revolution and War, ed Mostafa Rejal (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday & Doubleday, inc, 1969), 227–253. 
74 Andrew R. Molnar, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare 
(Washington, DC: American University, 1963), 32–33. 
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5. Consolidation 
This phase begins when mass organizations begin to exercise more political 
control over the entire movement. The underground begins to establish shadow 
governments in response to this demand, using armed guerrillas to enforce its authority. 
First, as the state’s ability to impose order in a given area is reduced, underground 
members propose that a vote is held for liberation committees and the underground 
ensures that it is staffed by the underground in “elections.” The liberation committee 
establishes schools, courts, and other symbols of authority under its control in order to 
bring the population to heel. The shadow governments put reactionaries, corrupt officials, 
and other elements of an unknown quantity on trial in order to demonstrate that justice is 
restored and order has been brought about by the underground, as well as to impose the 
desired amount of control upon the population.75 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have reviewed both existing UW doctrine and Andrew Molnar’s 
work on UW for specific practices and identified the underground as the basic 
organizational element in unconventional warfare. I then reviewed Molnar’s five phases 
of underground development against the writings of Lenin, Mao, and Giap, ultimately 
concluding that Molnar’s five phases were the best framework for underground 
development. From that review, I concluded that there were three tasks to be completed 
in order to develop a resilient organization capable of supporting the emergence of a 
guerrilla force. I then reviewed several prominent works on social movement theory for 
key concepts that could be used to further develop those three tasks, to be conducted 
across Molnar’s five phased approach to revolution. The case studies in chapters three 
and four will review the development of underground resistance networks in Vietnam 
from 1954 to 1974, and in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation in World War 
II.  
 
                                                 
75 Andrew Molnar, Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 48–53. 
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III. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IN SOUTH 
VIETNAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) employed a 
methodical template for infiltrating and converting a village into a mobilized force, in a 
“people’s revolution” against the Government of South Vietnam.76This was done in four 
phases consisting of clandestine organization building, psychological preparation of the 
people, expansion of control, and consolidation of power.77 This case study demonstrates 
critical aspects of developing the underground. First, a doctrine for resistance is an 
effective method for the development of a cohesive structure among existing resistance 
groups. Second, the development of liberation associations as social networks enables 
both security and recruitment. Third, agitation-propaganda is an effective tool in support 
of underground development and population control. Finally, the application of 
contentious politics and selective violence is also an effective tool in developing and 
controlling the underground membership. 
The chapter begins with a brief historical review of resistance in Vietnam from 
the partitioning of the country in 1954 until the U.S. departure in 1974, and then review 
the development of the underground at the village level using Molnar’s five phases of 
underground development.78 In each phase, the expansion of the organizational structure 
and its capacity for operations is discussed.  
                                                 
76 William R. Andrews, The Village War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 156. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Andrew Molnar, Human Factor Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 16–18. Andrew Molnar’s five phases 
for protracted war are clandestine organization, psychological offensive, expansion, militarization, and 
consolidation. 
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B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Ho Chi Minh, after studying the work of Lenin in Paris and Moscow, returned to 
Asia and assisted in the formation of the Revolutionary Youth League in 1925.79 
Recognizing the need to bring the nationalist and the communist organizations under a 
single banner, Ho wrote an application of Marx to the question of revolution in Vietnam, 
and struggled to bring groups together.80 In the 1930s, the global economic recession and 
communist organizers combined to organize workers and peasants, and fan the flames of 
discontent, resulting in strikes in a series of factories.81 Strikes in factories spread into the 
countryside, resulting in demonstrations that escalated into violence and political 
disorder.82 Communist organizers encouraged the creation of village associations to 
replace local government and the establishment of local militias.83The French Foreign 
Legion ultimately put this down with vigor,84 but the foundations of underground 
resistance had been laid. 
After the French had been displaced by the Japanese in World War II, a campaign 
of resistance against the Japanese was initiated in conjunction with operatives from the 
Office of Strategic Services.85 The underground continued to develop following the 
Japanese occupation of Vietnam. Following the war, the British and Nationalist Chinese 
were assigned responsibility for managing Vietnam, the Chinese in the north and the 
British in the south. Whereas the Chinese did not actively repress Viet Minh activity in 
the north, British forces in the south, under Major General Douglas Gracey, were wont to 
antagonize the locals by arming French and Japanese to police the peninsula, giving the 
                                                 
79 Ibid.,18. 
80 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
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81 Ibid., 36. 
82 Ibid., 37. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 40. 
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Viet Minh reason to resist.86 Viet Minh resistance to the French continued until the 1954 
Geneva conference, when fighting was brought to a halt following the French disaster at 
Dien Bien Phu. Ho Chi Minh summoned the Viet Minh in the south back to Hanoi while 
negotiations could be undertaken with regards to unification.87 These forces would re-
infiltrate the south as it became clear that the U.S. and the new Government of South 
Vietnam were unlikely to allow national unification elections.88 
In September 1960, the North Vietnamese Third Party Congress created the 
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) in order to more fully infiltrate 
South Vietnamese society. This was an effort to disguise the cadre mobilization of the 
peasantry as a movement organic to South Vietnam. Subsequently, the Viet Minh era 
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) was re-opened as the southern branch of the 
North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party.89 Peaceful unification of the 
Vietnamese peninsula by means of the plebiscite outlined by the Geneva Conference of 
1954 was unlikely, and a naked invasion by the north into the south was militarily 
untenable. Because President Ngo Dinh Diem’s political control over the rural population 
was weak and his ability to impose political order minimal, the political tool chosen by 
the communist party of North Vietnam was a people’s revolution led by communist party 
cadre. Various cadre members, remnants from resistance to the Japanese and subsequent 
French occupations, had remained in South Vietnam after the peninsula was split, waiting 
for the promised plebiscite and potential unification. When it became apparent that the 
south would refuse to participate in the referendum, these former cadres began organizing 
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along former lines of resistance.90They were joined by cadre from the north in 1959,91 
and organized under the National Liberation Front in 1960.92 
The underground organization in the south was conducted under the leadership 
and direction of the communist party of North Vietnam. The national front organizations, 
village associations, and other mass or popular organizations in South Vietnam were 
largely controlled by the communist party.93  
C. PHASE ONE: ORGANIZATION 
In 1960,94 the Lao Dong Party Central Committee had decades of experience with 
resistance to foreign powers. The Vietnamese had experience rousing the masses in 
demonstration and uprising, many former Viet Minh, to include Ho Chi Minh, had 
experience with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services against the Japanese in the 1940s.95 
The organization already had a sizeable force of trained cadre with experience against the 
French-Bao Dai government as well as other subversive movements in South Vietnam.96 
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1. Structural Configuration 
The NLF was established as united front organization that was intended to 
disguise the hand of the North Vietnam based communist party. The front was used to 
hide a national chain of command for the village and provincial and interprovincial party 
chapters.97  
Vertically, the organization was designed along the provincial lines that the Viet 
Minh had organized the peninsula into during their resistance against the French. The 
Peninsula was divided into nine inter-zones, again into 44 provinces, and further into 
villages.98 Similarly, the NLF was organized with a central committee, a provincial 
committee, then district, and then village party chapter.99Within the village, in the 
organizational phase, the village party chapter consisted of three to five man teams that 
included a village area specialist who was typically from the general area.  
2. Intelligence and Recruitment 
The village assessment team would establish a base within a reasonable distance 
of the village in question. The assessment team would travel to the village to conduct a 
census and ascertain the geography of the area, regime presence, the village social 
situation, and potential strength of the party within the village.100 Subsequent census 
taking would categorize villagers into one of five demographics, from very poor farmers 
to rich farmers and landlords. Targeted recruiting for potential party members would 
follow, with the recruiting pool being divided into six categories: families with relatives 
in the party, people with family problems, people with debt or legal troubles, lower 
classes in general, popular young people, and finally, anyone not “burdened” with 
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education.101 The intent of the census taking was to create a picture of potential party or 
mass organization members, landlords and wealthy villagers to be dispossessed, and 
regime representation to be removed from office and punished.102The organizational 
outcome of the census taking was that the cadres were able to create an attractive menu of 
incentives with which to recruit. Those recruited were obviously those with least amount 
invested in the current system, by and large the poor and landless. The organization was 
then able to target the obvious enemy of the people, the wealthy landowners, for selective 
violence. This effectively removed those who would support the state, and empowered 
those who had nothing to lose. 
Recruiting for the civil affairs committee in the organizational phase was focused 
very much on quality rather than quantity. The general preference for recruiting was for 
popular young people who could influence other young people, and the uneducated, 
whose minds were not “cluttered with incorrect political and social thought.”103 Once a 
small number were recruited to the party, it would represent the party within the 
village.104 In this early period, recruiting was focused on “…persuasion, “sweet talk,” 
and the manipulated, gradual involvement of the youth…”105 The narrative of 
independence, nationalism, and communism had what Snow and Benford referred to as a 
narrative with broad range.106That is, the National Liberation ’Front’s framing effort was 
linked to core values that did have high resonation with village youth. In an effort to 
expand the inclusiveness of the primary narrative, recruiters incorporated other values 
into the narrative, in this case popularity and the allure of high adventure. This process is 
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referred to by McCarthy as frame bridging, wherein the organization links itself to 
“…unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters.”107 
The cadre members that made up the village assessment teams and early civil 
affairs committees were comprised of a large number of former Viet Minh cadres that 
remained in the south after 1954, and whose ranks were bolstered with former cadre that 
infiltrated from the north, many of whom had familial ties to the south.108 Key strengths 
for these cadres were pre-existing social networks, and the networks of former members 
that remained in the south. Cadres that remained in the south were able to use legal status 
to provide intelligence to the front or monitor local families for potential recruits. 
Returning cadres were able to call upon old networks to reenlist former cadre 
members.109 When President Diem announced in 1955 that the reunification election 
would not be held, an attempt was made to identify and incarcerate former Viet Minh 
members, ultimately leading to a galvanized force of insurgent cadre.110 Former cadre 
members that escaped identification, or who were released, created secure “base areas” in 
geographically remote regions such as the swampy Plain of Reeds or in thick jungle areas 
where it was difficult for the government to penetrate. In these areas, cadres reformed, 
trained, and went out to conduct propaganda campaigns and establish civil affairs 
committees.111 These embedded112 cadres were similar to the single members of the 
National Socialist Party in Germany (NSDAP) in the 1920s and 1930s. Referred to as 
movement entrepreneurs by Helmut Anheier, the goal of the movement entrepreneur is to 
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maximize the organization at the local level.113 NSDAP members joined community 
organizations, embedded themselves, and then converted or recruited those organizations 
into party chapters.114 There are two critical benefits to this style of embedding and 
recruiting. First is that the pre-existing organizational structures in place are coopted into 
the underground. Pre-existing structures allowed the new cadres to develop resource 
mobilizing and operational systems along traditional lines, making the new system seem 
as if it had always been. Second is that embedded recruiters are able to conduct efficient 
bloc recruiting as members of the targeted organization.  
The security of the civil affairs committee during the organizational phase was 
paramount to all other concerns. The committee personnel were expected to hide their 
status from the community and even immediate family. The committee itself was highly 
compartmentalized; each cell within the party maintained separate and secret egress and 
refuge locations for inevitable regime searches of the area.115 Communication between 
the civil affairs committee and the district committee was conducted via a drop box 
consisting of a clay jar with a message at a pre-designated location, to be changed 
periodically in order to avoid establishing a pattern.116 Compartmentalizing cells in this 
manner, and restricting communication to remote drop boxes is a critical practice in 
maintaining security.   
As demonstrated above, the underground movement in South Vietnam performed 
all three essential tasks in the organizational phase. A trained and disciplined cadre was 
created leveraging the French occupation and President Diem’s repression. The same 
cadre established a system of committees at the village and provincial levels. A united 
front organization established in 1960 was capable of bringing together revolutionary 
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groups such as the People’s Revolutionary Party together with the Buddhists and 
Catholics.   
D. PHASE TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE 
This phase is characterized as the psychological preparation of the people. 
Broadly speaking, the intent in this phase of protracted revolutionary warfare is to first 
break down or co-opt civil society and subsequently rebuild it into mass, or social, 
organizations. Those organizations are then used to educate the people, raise their 
political consciousness, and prepare them for conflict with the regime. There are three 
essential tasks in this phase. First, embedded cadre members should start limited local 
recruiting. Second, the same cadre members should start connecting their networks with 
those of other cadre members. Third, the doctrine for resistance should begin to be 
socialized, with varying degrees of intensity. 
1. Horizontal Expansion 
In this phase, the horizontal structure of the party at the village level was 
expanded to include a propaganda section, and a security section. Operational security 
was lessened as the cells took on new members. However, this compromise was 
mitigated as not all members of the new cells are necessarily members of the party. The 
two new sections worked closely in this phase, as the first use of armed propaganda 
teams brought the party out of strictly clandestine operations. 
2. Propaganda 
Mao Tse Tung, in On Revolutionary Warfare, divided propaganda into three 
broad categories: that conducted among between the soldiers and the officers, between 
the army and the people, and among the soldiers of the enemy.117 Propaganda efforts 
among the enemy were those operations undertaken among the rural people living in 
areas controlled by the Diem regime. Actions among the people were those actions taken 
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in areas controlled by the front. Action among the troops was a campaign conducted 
among the civil service and soldiers of the government of Vietnam. 118 
Propaganda at the inter-provincial level and below was organized into two 
essential agencies; one, a training and propaganda agency, and two, an agency for enemy 
troop and civilian propaganda.119 The training and propaganda agency published print 
and film media with regards to statements and claims by the NLF, maintained a 
propaganda school, and conducted reeducation for those with flagging orthodoxy. The 
other agency divided its work between the enemy troops and the civilian population. 
Among the enemy, work was further broken into two activities: assisting the young 
people in evading conscription, and creating a network within the security forces for 
information, promoting desertion, and lowering morale. Within the civilian population, a 
concerted effort was made to put every individual into a mass organization, which was in 
and of itself a psychological operation, as it was believed that the individual would 
develop a vested interest in the organization based on personal effort over time.120 
Until the militarization phase, the ratio of underground activity to open 
propaganda activity leaned in favor of underground activity. As noted above, 
membership in the various liberation associations was expected to perform the function 
of communication of the front narrative with groups of people, once they had been 
brought to an association meeting.121 Interpersonal communication was believed to be a 
more effective than a statement on the radio or in print. For that reason, as well as 
concern for security, individual association members were expected to bring friends and 
family members to association meetings, where they would receive indoctrination.122 
Overt propaganda generally came in the form of the struggle movement, when large 
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groups would be brought together to present an unsolvable issue to local, legitimate 
authority using some mode of contentious politics.123  
The propaganda strategy at the village level, prior to village liberation, had two 
lines of operation. First, an informational strategy stressed four themes: one, increasing 
feelings of discontent and subsequently mobilizing patriotic feelings; two, explaining the 
efforts being made to separate party and people; three, educating the locals on the 
political and military struggle for South Vietnam; and four, educating the locals on party 
policy, North Vietnam, socialism, and world news.124 This framing strategy performed 
all three of Snow and Benford’s core framing tasks: diagnosis of the problem, with a 
proposed solution, followed by a call for action.125 First, the poverty of the villagers was 
diagnosed as the result of political injustice. Second, the proposed solution was a village 
specific variation on the themes of nationalism, communism, independence, or a blending 
of the three.126 Finally, the call to action was for each villager to do his or her part by 
joining one of the front associations or networks.   
This approach to framing by the agitation-propaganda team performed four 
actions in mobilizing the village. First, by discussing the difficulties of the village, the 
propaganda team was attempting to realign the view that social conditions were “just and 
immutable” to a view that they were “unjust and mutable.”127 Second, by invoking 
patriotic feelings the propaganda team employing what is referred to in social movement 
theory as value amplification. This is a process by which values that are presumed to be 
important to the audience, but have not produced action, are given new emphasis in order 
to produce a result. A secondary benefit to value amplification is that it can also be used 
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by the movement entrepreneur to realign the image of the movement.128 Third, through 
discussing the party policies and goals, as well as the military and political struggle, a 
process called belief amplification occurred. Belief amplification is liberally explained as 
relationships between a thing and a characteristic about that thing.129 In this case, the 
thing was the U.S.–Diem clique, and the characteristic was their exploitation of the 
peasants and farmers. Finally, by discussing world events, party policies such as land 
reform and education, and giving lectures on party doctrine the agitation team extended 
their frame to include other possible points of interest that might have proved important 
to the audience.130 
The other strategy was referred to as the destruction of the oppression.131 This 
was the first emergence of agitation propaganda teams and armed propaganda units. The 
general intent behind this program was to eliminate traditional village leadership roles, 
eliminating legitimate state institutions, and intimidating the population into non-
compliance with the Diem government, effective, as noted by the following witness: 
In 1959, many leaflets and posters were spread in my hamlet. They were 
leaflets and posters made by the [party]. One night the party’’s followers 
came into my village, all of a sudden, to carry out the “destruction of the 
oppression.” They arrested the chairman of the National Revolutionary 
Movement, led him to the rice field, shot, and killed him. After that, they 
disseminated leaflets which accounted for this killing and mentioned the 
charges against the dead...the villagers were very afraid. The ’party’s 
followers were then led by a man, named Dong, who came from my 
village. He was a poor peasant and several months before he had left the 
village for an unknown place.132 
Destruction of the oppression made general usage of terrorism in the form of “reduction 
in prestige” operations133 against government officials, selective assassination, and 
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general intimidation.134 The intent was to force the government officials, landlords, and 
anyone with a vested interest in the Diem regime to live away from the village for fear of 
party punishment; a crucial first step in establishing a shadow government.135 
Agitation propaganda teams (agit-prop) teams were employed to execute the 
informational strategy in the rural hamlets and villages that comprised the backbone of 
the insurgency. Teams were typically given two weeks of communist indoctrination, 
followed by ten days of training in agit-prop technique.136 The use of the agit-prop teams 
rests on several fundamental ideas about information warfare. First, that propaganda itself 
is for the indoctrination of cadre members.137 The masses are to be agitated in to motion, 
hence the agit-prop team. Second, the real indoctrination of the masses is done through 
work in organized mass education and criticism sessions managed by agit-prop teams.138  
Third, the most powerful medium is interpersonal communication.139 Fourth, that simple 
communication is normally ineffective, as most people have anchor points for their 
perceptions, and that the opinion of the majority and concurrent social pressure count for 
more than leaders and experts.140 The success of the agit-prop team did not lie in simply 
passing out pamphlets and handbills, rather in persistent interaction with villagers 
through meetings and classes in which the cadre would lead the peasant through the 
Socratic Method into correct political thought.141  
The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967) offers a 
comprehensive review of the theory of agit-prop: 
                                                 
134 William R. Andrews, The Village War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 55–
62. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 
South Viet Nam (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 129. 
137 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 
South Viet Nam (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 120–121. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 
South Viet Nam (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 126–135. 
141 Ibid. 
  34 
Mass media, to the [Vietnamese] Communists, are reinforcement tools 
only, and not considered strong enough to carry the burden of convincing 
the unconvinced. Thus, VC agit-prop cadre are employed to explain to 
ordinary citizens the current line of the party and also to justify by 
whatever arguments are most likely to be effective, the current party line 
and whatever changes are necessary. The complex VC political 
infrastructure is in fact part of the VC propaganda apparatus; the 
Communists, since about 1961, enmeshed the rural Vietnamese in a 
network of so-called “liberation associations”…and under the guidance of 
propaganda cadre, these are used as the vehicle for the communication of 
ideas. In every village where they operate, the VC uses this organizational 
weapon to indoctrinate the people at rallies, mass meetings, etc.142 
The use of agit-prop teams as armed propaganda was a powerful technique in garnering 
participation. First, the presence of an armed team that came to the village implied both 
the threat and strength of an authority. Threat and strength compelled the villagers to 
participate in the performance put on by the agit-prop team, which invoked Cialdini’s 
principles of social proof143 and commitment and consistency144, maintaining 
involvement and interest. Breaking the crowd into small groups, led by cadre members, 
in order to discuss the information presented created a situation in which the villager feels 
he or she must speak but does not want to offend the armed cadre. Since cadre members 
tailored narratives to fit audiences based on a census of local grievances, the village 
member finds a few positive things to say and negotiates an awkward social situation. 
That further invoked the commitment/ consistency principal, in that people have a 
tendency to maintain a position once they have publicly stated it. Finally, the cadre 
brought the crowd together again for testimonials. These interactive processes made the 
village, if not supportive, at least open to further discussion and possible liberation 
associations. 
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While commitment and consistency and social proof145 may bring villagers into 
front organizations, the decision to become a participant in a movement is not a constant 
over time. Participation in a movement, particularly a dangerous, taxing movement such 
as an insurgent underground movement, is subject to rethinking when the agit-prop team 
has gone. By establishing democratic discussion, criticism and self-criticism sessions, 
and a menu of positive and negative incentives146 in front regulations, the front ensured 
favorable frame transformation. Frame transformation is the process by which values, 
decisions, and beliefs are reviewed and reinforced discarded as no longer valid.147  
E. PHASE THREE: EXPANSION 
Underground development in the third phase is the mass organization. The NLF 
was not the first to create such organizations, and capitalized on the existence of others; 
in particular the People’s Revolutionary Party Youth League, and the Vanguard Youth 
League.148 Both organizations were socialist, the former for teens and the latter for pre-
teens, were focused on hating imperialism and educating the young people in correct 
political thought, and perhaps most importantly, put emphasis on strict obedience to the 
directives of the party.149 
There are three priorities of work in the third phase of underground development. 
First, mass organizations should be created that take on part time members. Second, the 
underground should begin conducting some level of political contention in order to gain 
credibility and aid in recruiting. Finally, as the organization develops, effort should be 
made to create a united front with other organizations. 
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1. Hierarchical Expansion 
In this phase, the village level organization saw hierarchical growth with limited 
horizontal expansion. As the village civil affairs committee grew beyond the proscribed 
three or more official party members, a party chapter was established; nine or more and a 
Chapter Party Committee was formed, and elected three to seven members to manage 
daily business. This organization would execute tasking’s from higher echelons of 
command, establish and manage mass organizations, and enforce operational security and 
member discipline.150 Eventually this organization would establish the local shadow 
government, impose taxes, and, in theory, would become the liberation committee if the 
revolution moved beyond guerrilla war into conventional fighting.151 In the expansion 
phase, however, the liberation committee established and managed three basic 
associations: the Farmer’s Liberation Association, the Women’s Liberation Association, 
and the Youth Liberation Association.152 
2. Mass Organizations 
As noted above the purpose of the mass organization was inherently 
psychological, and deemed to be the most efficient way to mobilize the masses by 
ensuring that everyone from young to old could contribute in some fashion. The NLF had 
three primary goals: first, maintain support for the insurgency through the formation and 
control of the organizations, two, draw support from the population into the organization, 
and three, neutralize support for state efforts to reform and pacify.153 
                                                 
150 Michael Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of 
Organization and Strategy, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American 
University, 1966), 244–245. Regulations of the Communist Party and Communist Youth Organizations in 
South Vietnam. 
151 Andrew Molnar, Human Factor Considerations in Underground Insurgencies (Washington, DC: 
American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 18. 
152 William R. Andrews, The Village War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 72–
74. 
153 Michael Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of 
Organization and Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American 
University, 1966), 77. 
  37 
For the NLF, the liberation associations performed these functions effectively. 
The Women’s and Farmer’s liberation associations were regulated in nearly the same 
manner, with members paying association dues, being responsible for indoctrinating 
unaffiliated neighbors and acquaintances, preserving secrecy, electing members and 
delegates for higher echelon work, and being subject to awards and discipline as 
proscribed by party regulation. The youth association differed in that members were 
expected to improve themselves through vigorous education, and to extend that education 
to other young people in an effort to expand the recruiting pool by raising political 
consciousness.154 
Liberation associations were managed, by and large, through three mediums of 
control. First, associations were managed by at least one overt cadre member.155 Second, 
potential association members underwent a vetting process that at the most permissive 
level required the approval of an executive committee and at the more exclusive required 
some level of indoctrination,156 and occasionally a challenge of some sort.157 Finally, 
criticism and self-criticism sessions imposed a social control over individual members by 
which they self-reinforced behavioral norms through a process in which the individual 
would critique his and his neighbors for correct behavior.158 As noted above, there also 
existed a proscribed list of fines and punishments to reinforce behavioral norms. 
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3. Recruitment 
After 1963 the underground developed a three-stage process for creating 
volunteers. First, young people would be talked into joining the NLF in some capacity, 
and subsequently marched off to a remote training area.159 Once in a training area, 
recruits would be put to work in menial tasks and eventually put into deep political 
indoctrination. Eventually, conscripts are given an opportunity to ‘“volunteer’” for 
service, at which point they may be moved back to the village for work in the local 
resistance or packed off to the “main force.”160 Volunteers lacking sufficient 
revolutionary zeal might be given an opportunity to serve on a farming unit until some 
combat duty began to seem appealing.161 
Another technique of recruiting and vetting was gradual involvement in order to 
transition a potential recruit from “legal” to “illegal” status. Typically, young village 
people would initially be given some small task, such as passing out flags or transporting 
rice, and then minor acts of sabotage and propaganda.162 The assignments would 
continue until the activity was discovered and the unwitting recruit became illegal and 
was forced to join the “main force” or a fifth column in order to avoid punishment.163  
Recruiting techniques varied from compelling individuals to volunteer for some 
sort of service, from hamlet militia or propaganda to joining the main force, to simply 
conscripting young people and marching them off to a training and indoctrination camp 
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in the jungle. The recurring theme is that recruiting generally focused on individuals, and 
relies on the individual to become entangled in the Viet Cong system and for 
interpersonal interaction and indoctrination to create an “awakening” moment in which 
the individual embraces the movement.164 
4. Developing Public Support 
A RAND Corporation study in influencing public support offers the following 
four factors and related sub factors as measures of effectiveness in developing support for 
an illicit movement. 165  The first factor in developing public support is the effectiveness 
of the organization in packaging ideology, mobilizing resources, and providing leadership 
in action. The second is generating motivation for supporting the movement. Third is the 
perceived legitimacy of violence, and fourth is the acceptability of costs and risks.  
As previously noted, the effectiveness of the NLF organization at the village level 
was in the development of committees and associations. First village assessment teams 
conducted a census of an area and conduct clandestine, targeted recruiting.166 Later a 
civil affairs committee was formed.167  As the committee grew, the village organization 
would expand to include associations and a wider hierarchy of village leadership, 
managed by party members.168 This system of organizing allowed the underground to 
mobilize resources with taxes, association dues, and labor.169 Leadership was at the 
village level, in the underground organizations, and thus able to take advantage of 
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opportunities. The underground was also able to mobilize the village for contentious 
action,170 or in the terms of the RAND study, presence, words, and deeds. 
The combination of agitation-propaganda teams and a menu of positive incentives 
were successful in generating motivation for front organizations in the village. Teams 
made extensive use of the sub-factors of attraction, duty, and honor by making appeals to 
patriotism and self-interest,171 mass recruitment meetings,172 and highly personalized 
appeals to either join the guerrilla force or at least to serve near the home.173 The land for 
the landless, or land to the tiller campaigns provided an obvious reward for the portion of 
the population that the front was interested in recruiting: 
The cadre propagandized that the youths should fight the enemy and 
reclaim the land. This propaganda made me very enthusiastic because I 
wanted to kill the enemy and I wanted to have the land. I knew very well 
how miserable the life of a landless peasant was.174 
The negative impact of the land reform was its effect on motivation to take part in action 
beyond joining the mass movement. Once the demand for land was satisfied, interest in 
action decreased.175 
For the cadre organizing at the village level, the acceptability of costs and risks 
factor was a dichotomy of positive and negative incentives. The villager was often in a 
position where he was farming land that belonged to an absentee landlord who would 
periodically extract rent.176 The presence of the cadre and the underground organization 
prevented that, but also took a toll on the peasantry in the form of taxes and service 
requirements. While the peasant may have had a difficult time in assessing who would 
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win the war in Vietnam, he certainly could see who was controlling his village. Even had 
there been a local, reliable security or policing apparatus to report front activities to, it 
would have led to reprisals against the family of the informant. 
F. PHASES FOUR AND FIVE: MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION 
The key tasks in the final phases is creating and employing military force, while 
still controlling the population. The expansion of the NLF security section into guerrilla 
warfare marked the beginning of the militarization phase. At the village level, 
paramilitary forces were organized to support the development of shadow government 
and underground operations, as well as to support “regular force” operations.177  
The village paramilitary was divided into three categories of militant: combat 
guerrillas, village guerrillas, and self-defense militia.178 These forces were the bulwark of 
the underground security element. Combat guerrillas were generally armed with a variety 
of second-hand small arms and were supported with village rice contributions. Their 
contribution to the underground was more like that of an aggressive police force. They 
guarded the village, assisted in collecting taxes, established roadblocks and checked 
strangers for identification, and assisted the propaganda section as needed179. Village 
guerrillas were equipped with anti-personnel devices to injure the unwary.180 Self-
defense militia consisted of unarmed peasants who provided labor and assistance with 
sabotage.181 
1. Underground Application of Violence 
While the inter-provincial military elements made use of ambush and harassment 
of South Vietnamese government and U.S. security forces, the underground at the village 
level was focused on sabotage, subversion, violence against individuals, and selective use 
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of terror.182 These tactics served the three basic imperatives of security, recruitment, and 
intimidation by impressing rural villagers with the NLF’s ability to use violence at will to 
both resist the government and punish traitors.183 
2. Population and Information Control 
The fifth phase has begun when a shadow government is established. The shadow 
government must be capable of controlling three facets of the local area. First, the actions 
of the local population must be controlled. Second, outside information that the local 
population receives must be controlled in order to manipulate the popular perception of 
the resistance.184 Finally, information that the local population transmits outside of itself 
must be controlled in order for the underground to protect its information advantage.185 
The National Liberation Front managed the population and information at the village 
level in six categories: village surveillance, manipulation of information, restriction of 
movement, communalization of labor, targeted violence, and party internal control 
devices.186  
Surveillance as a system of population control187 was achieved through an 
adaptation of the pao chia system of families living in clustered areas being assigned to 
watch another family, and mutual surveillance conducted in organizations between party 
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members and less trustworthy elements.188 The party eliminated competing information 
in liberated areas by prohibiting any listening to ‘“enemy’” radio broadcasts, censoring 
mail and print media coming into the village, by allowing only party produced print 
media into the village. In order to further isolate individual villages, the names of roads 
and landmarks were all changed in order to prevent commonality between liberated areas 
and areas controlled by the state.189 Village residents were severely restricted in 
movement through the use of land confiscation, that is, should a resident relocate to a 
government controlled area, his or his families land would be confiscated for re-
distribution. Family members of residents serving the Diem government could be sent for 
re-education or worse.190 The farmer’s liberation association created labor exchange 
squads in which it organized famers to perform menial labor throughout the hamlet and 
province, in order to condition the peasants to understand that the fruits of their labor did 
not belong to them, and were inherently cooperative. 191 Targeted violence came in the 
form of “people’s courts” where peasants were selectively brought before the village to 
answer for “crimes.” During the trial, the party would ask for the crowd’s verdict, and 
party members planted in the crowd would call for whatever the pre-determined verdict 
was to be, release, re-education, or death.192 Finally, party members were managed with 
criticism and self-criticism sessions in which their behavior and incorrect political 
thought would be reviewed.193 
While not all unique to the final phase, these methods of population control were 
steadily developed, and by the consolidation phase could all be expected to be in 
employment, the hallmark of the consolidation phase. 
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3. Village Revolutionary Activities 
The fully mobilized village performed three general functions in support of the 
insurgency: the “struggle movement” or contentious politics, logistical support to 
operations conducted by regular forces, and manpower support to operations conducted 
by regular forces.194 
The struggle movement was essentially a well-organized protest. First, a mass 
meeting of residents and association members was held, a single protest issue was raised 
and attendants were encouraged to speak about it. Party members were planted in the 
crowd to shout slogans and share emotional testimonials. Second, the mass meeting 
would turn into a protest group and descend upon government offices, disrupt traffic or 
daily activities, disrupt activities by a local official, and generally disrupt the normal 
routine of the area. Finally, when the protest was over, the attendants would return to the 
original meeting place to praise high levels of demonstrated zeal, and to criticize poor 
performance.195 
When regular military forces were conducting operations in a given region, the 
local underground was expected to provide logistical and manpower support. 
Logistically, the self-defense militia and the myriad liberation associations on hand were 
meant to provide transportation and food, prepare caches of munitions and supplies, 
house soldiers, prepare field hospitals, and provide messenger services.196 For 
manpower, the commander of the local guerrilla force was obligated to assist operations 
to the extent that he was capable. In an insightful nod to the difficulties inherent in 
underground activities, the local guerrilla commander enjoyed a certain amount of 
autonomy, and was free to refuse to participate if he disagreed with the plan. He was, 
however, obligated to provide soldiers, and in the time honored military tradition of 
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“passing off the slackers,” troublemakers were traditionally sent to support the regular 
force, while quality soldiers were retained at the local guerrilla level.197 
G. CONCLUSION  
The National Liberation Front cadre was able to effectively complete the three 
tasks outlined in chapter two by utilizing a methodical approach to infiltrating and 
subverting the village. First, creating village assessment teams and civil affairs 
committees with former Viet Minh cadre198 enabled the National Liberation Front to 
adapt its revolutionary doctrine to the specific grievances of the village population.199 
Second, dismantling competing village institutions200 and replacing them with party 
organizations201 created a situation in which the cadre members could recreate a segment 
of civil society in a manner more suited to their operational needs. Third, involving as 
many segments of the village population as possible in a liberation association created a 
situation wherein villagers participated in the underground by virtue of 
membership.202Finally, the circulation of agitation-propaganda teams through villages 
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was a reinforcing mechanism that introduced new propaganda and forced villagers to 
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IV. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES 
“If I worked in those sugar fields, I’d be a Huk myself.”204 
—Douglas MacArthur 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case study was chosen for its wide variety of resistance movements and 
underground structures. Although there were 50 acknowledged guerrilla organizations,205 
this chapter will offer a review of the more prominent American and Filipino guerrilla 
organizations, and will then conduct an analysis of their organization of the underground 
across Molnar’s five phases: clandestine organization, psychological offensive, 
expansion, militarization, and consolidation. The first guerrilla movement is the 
Hukbalahap movement,206 the second movement is the United States Armed Forces, Far 
East (USAFFE), and the third is the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP). 
These three movements were chosen for three reasons. First, they were the largest 
guerrilla organizations.207 Second, they each formed robust undergrounds in different 
manners. Finally, they each operated against the Japanese differently. Russell Volckmann 
and Don Blackburn spent time among the tribes of northern Luzon conducting bloc 
recruitment. In contrast the Huks of central Luzon were already organizing when the 
Japanese defeated the American-Filipino army. Like the Huks, Wendel Fertig, on 
Mindanao, was establishing civil governance as a way to unify the many bands of 
guerrillas that were forming. The variety and depth in this case study could be broken 
into three separate studies on the underground, dealing with each of the three major 
organizations. 
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This chapter will begin with a brief review of the events leading up to the 
Japanese occupation, and the categories of guerrilla organizations that subsequently 
emerged. There will be a brief overview of the three core resistance groups and the events 
that facilitated their initial formation, as well as an example of a “false start” group. It 
will then review specific instances that enhanced or retracted the expansion of 
underground organizations across Molnar’s five phases of underground development.208 
Because the types of guerrilla organizations varies widely, at end of each phase there will 
be a review of the actions of each guerrilla organization. The real significance of this 
chapter lies in five key points. First, dispersing forces is a protective measure against 
repression. Second, individuals can effectively conduct bloc recruitment among pre-
existing organizations. Third, guerrilla formations evolved into shadow government and 
began conducting political warfare. Finally, establishing separate cells is an effective 
security measure. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
After fifteen days of air strikes 43,000 Japanese soldiers landed at Lingayen Gulf, 
on the north end of Luzon, on December 22, 1941. General Douglas MacArthur, with an 
out-gunned and under-trained force of American service men and Filipino conscripts and 
reservists, sent Major General Jonathan “Skinny” Wainwright IV with infantry and 
cavalry to fight a defense in depth, causing casualties and yielding ground in exchange 
for time while MacArthur maneuvered the remainder of the force from metropolitan 
Manila up into the high ground at Bataan. Lacking airpower and modern impedimenta of 
war, as well as basic items, such as food, allied forces were compelled to surrender. 
While the majority surrendered, a large number of soldiers and civilians alike decided 
that they would prefer to either continue resistance or wait for the wars end in the remote 
wilderness regions.209  
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1. The Hukbalahap, USAFFE, and USFIP: Setting the Stage for 
Resistance 
Prior to the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, four conditions were set to 
facilitate resistance to the coming occupation. First, Fascism in general, and the Japanese 
invasion of China, specifically, had developed a significant amount of concern in 
Manila.210 Second, the United States had already promised that the Philippines would be 
independent before the invasion; the Japanese intended to incorporate the Philippines into 
their empire.211 Third, because of the aggressive nature of the Japanese foreign policy 
and the growing conflict between the Japanese and the Americans, Filipinos saw the 
looming threat of invasion coming, and knew they would have to make a choice between 
the two foreign powers, and gamble on the outcome. Fourth, abandoned military 
equipment and supplies throughout the island was on hand to equip guerrilla outfits. 212 
Three major movements emerged to resist the occupation, the Hukbalahap, U.S. 
Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE) guerrillas, and United States Forces in the Philippines 
(USFIP) guerrillas. Each of these three had separate catalysts that enabled them to 
emerge in the face of Japanese imposed social order. These will be discussed below in 
order. 
a. The Huks 
The Hukbalahap organization officially formed March 29, 1942.213 Prior 
to that, the various political movements in Manila had been meeting to voice opposition 
to fascism and Japanese foreign policy; following the December 8, 1941 invasion pro-
democracy groups, semi-socialist, openly communist, and trade unionists set aside their 
differences to elect a committee of fifteen members to direct national resistance through a 
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united front in February, 1942.214 These groups had been meeting in smaller groups prior 
to the invasion; the Friends of China and the Communist Party (PKP), for instance, had 
joined together to organize boycotts of Japanese goods or picket stores that sold Japanese 
goods in response to the Japanese war in China.215 The collective group was able to form 
a coalition so readily because the individual goals of groups were not necessarily in 
competition with one another. Groups opposing Japanese aggression and fascism in 
general were not terribly interested in the agrarian issues that General Workers Union or 
AMT, and the National Society of Peasants in the Philippines, or KPMP were struggling 
with, for instance. Neither were the socialist and communists necessarily opposed to the 
League for the Defense of Democracy; the founder of the league, Vicente Lava, was also 
an officer in the PKP. All of the groups were specifically interested in an Independent 
Philippines, and generally interested in social and economic problems.216 When the 
Japanese occupied Manila and arrested those who had spoken out against imperial Japan, 
including PKP officers,217 there was much more interest in a united front. 
Once formed, this group took two subsequent actions. First, it petitioned 
President Manuel Quezon to organize and train the civilian population to resist the 
Japanese. Second, it proposed to elect four members to form a military committee and 
organize a national resistance army. The President did not react to the petition, and 
subsequently went to the U.S. to form a government in exile. The military committee, 
comprised of members of the two largest, barrio based tenant farmer movements, formed 
the Hukbalahaps, or Anti-Japanese Army.218 
The military committee members, previous members of the AMT and the 
KPMP, militarized their former tenant farmers organizations. 219 The tenant farmers had 
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formed barrio–based organizations throughout the 1930s in response to an increase in 
absentee landlordism, the erosion of traditional peasant rights, and increasingly 
oppressive treatment of the peasant class.220  The organizations were intended to be a 
means of mutual support between harvests and a platform for collective bargaining with 
landlords and government.221 The barrio based organizations had spent the 1930s 
organizing to protest the landlords with contentious politics, such as burning or refusing 
to harvest crops. As political contention increased, landlord oppression increased 
correspondingly.222 For the population that the Huks were organizing, the Japanese 
represented an escalation of the repression and resistance that they had been involved 
with for nearly a decade. When the military committee members agreed to join together 
to form the Huks, they reorganized into regionally distributed squadrons of one hundred 
soldiers each.223 Regions were naturally subdivided by barrios, with squadrons 
subdivided into squads at the barrio level.224 As the Japanese fought USAFFE regular 
forces and chased guerrillas, the Huks took on a governing role in response to banditry 
and the general breakdown of society.225 The Huk shadow government developed into a 
political organization with a staff and local policemen.226 The local shadow government 
expanded into the Barrio United Defense Corps to support the guerrilla organization.227 
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The guerrilla organization expanded to include remote training camps228 as well as 
underground propaganda cells.229 
b. USAFFE Guerrillas 
The U.S. Armed Forces Far East guerrillas were initially a part of the 
uniformed, conventional formation that was defeated on Bataan and Corregidor. 
Following the surrender, a large number of soldiers opted to not give up.230 These 
initially congregated in camps in the remote corners of the archipelago.231 As the isolated 
groups converged, they established a chain of command among themselves, and reached 
out to local communities for support.232 They developed a sizeable underground support 
system and regimented themselves geographically.233 They were able to contact General 
MacArthur in Australia for operational guidance, and became a part of the South West 
Pacific Command’s intelligence apparatus and provided MacArthur with detailed 
intelligence until the invasion of the Philippines by the Allied Army. During this period, 
they waged a campaign of attrition in advance of the landings, and conducted a large 
scale guerrilla assault during the invasion. Following the liberation of the Philippines, 
they became a regular portion of the army.234      
c. USFIP Guerrillas 
On Mindanao a large number of “guerrillas” and bands of outlaws 
emerged in the power vacuum left by the Japanese invasion. The ranking officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig, promoted himself to general and assumed command 
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over the guerrilla organizations operating on the island.235 Fertig began imposing martial 
discipline upon the organizations, 236and establishing cells to gather intelligence and 
transmit it to General MacArthur.237 Fertig directed Filipino organizations in his 
command to establish civil governance in their areas that could be recognized by Qezon’s 
government in exile, print money in that government’s name, and organize the people for 
intelligence gathering and guerrilla operations.238 Fertig’s command continued to gather 
intelligence, and transmit information via radio and submarine to MacArthur’s staff 
through his return and the liberation.  
d. Walter Cushing’s False Start 
Notable in this first phase of underground development in the Philippines 
during the Japanese occupation is Walter Cushing. Walter Cushing, a Mexican-American 
civilian managing a gold mine in the Llocos Sur Mountains, decided to mobilize his 
employees into a two hundred (or so) man private army after the Japanese invaded 
Luzon. First, he organized them into the 121st (Guerrilla) Light Infantry Regiment. 
Second, he harangued a wandering U.S. Army officer into providing them with some 
rudimentary training. Third, he gathered the arms and ammunition in the nearby Filipino 
training camps, and cached it in the mine. When that was accomplished, he set about 
ambushing Japanese soldiers, destroying bridges, and harassing Japanese garrisons by 
throwing dynamite into their barracks and stealing their ammunition by night.239  
Following the fall of Corregidor, Cushing realized that further small unit 
action against the Japanese would be ineffective, and he dispersed the 121st into small 
camps in the Llocos Sur Mountains. Subsequently, he established a psychological 
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operations cell using radio sets from the mines to gather news from a San Francisco radio 
station and had it typed into the The Echo of the Free North newspaper, which circulated 
through Luzon throughout 1942.240 
Once the propaganda cell was established, Cushing infiltrated Manila and 
met with wealthy Filipino contacts in order to mobilize resources needed for the 
resistance. While in Manila, he was able to gather automatic weapons, ammunition, 
medicine and radios, twenty two American soldiers hiding in a church, and four Filipino 
doctors. He used these to establish a series of underground, operational cells stretching 
from Manila to the Llocos Sur Mountains.241 
Cushing then attempted to contact Colonel Thorpe in order to coordinate 
resistance efforts against the Japanese. While attempting to move south he was ambushed 
and killed; nevertheless, the cells he established continued to operate throughout the 
war.242 The Cushing case is an example of what Tarrow refers to as an ‘“early riser’” 
movement, or an organization that emerges and potentially creates a model of action for 
other groups that have not emerged, expose an opponent’s weakness, or produce new 
opportunities for action.243 In the example of Cushing, his organization fought the 
Japanese as partisans as long as was practicable before establishing dispersed guerrilla 
cells for long term resistance.244 
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2. The Emergence of Substantive Resistance 
There were three catalytic events245 that greatly contributed to the emergence of 
resistance. First, the shock of invasion, followed closely by excessive repression by the 
Japanese toward civilians, combined with a drastic increase in rural banditry created a 
situation in which Filipinos had to organize for protection.246 Second, pre-war 
organization of the United Front against the Japanese prepared the Huks in advance of the 
occupation.247  Finally, the abandonment of large stores of small arms and ammunition in 
training camps throughout Luzon armed resistance groups that would otherwise have 
faced the Japanese with Bolo knives and farming implements.248 
Japanese soldiers made sport of torture, made ill use of young women, and 
otherwise indiscriminately killed civilians.249  At the same time, groups of young 
Filipinos armed with bolo knives and stolen rifles formed to raid villages for money, 
food, and women.250 In central Luzon, Japanese use of the Philippine Constabulary 
against the rural population as well as bands of outlaws increased the solidarity of barrio 
residents with the Huks.251 In Mindanao, numerous bands of outlaws and guerrillas were 
fighting Lilliputian wars of territory throughout the island causing emergent regional 
power brokers to seek the ranking officer in the area to assume command of all forces.252  
Repression is a negative selective incentive imposed upon the resisting or 
protesting population.253 It can have the effect of deterring resistance if the repressed are 
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in a social group that applies a negative social sanction upon those participating in 
behavior that leads to repression,254 joining an underground resistance, for example. If 
the repression is especially brutal or otherwise deemed illegitimate, it can have the 
opposite effect, “When the demonstrators become the victims of brutal repression, their 
movement gains sympathy and even material support from people who have not suffered 
directly from the government’s excesses.”255 This begins a micromobilization process 
that “raises the rewards and diminishes costs of participation.”256 Japanese repression 
was applied indiscriminately and in manners inconsistent with the Filipino concept of 
justice, bringing about a micromobilization process in favor of resistance groups. In 
occupied Manila, for instance, although the Japanese were able to effectively repress the 
United National Front movement initially, underground groups continued to form. The 
League for National Liberation was formed by businessmen and professionals, 
presumably those with the least incentive to resist, for the purpose of funneling 
intelligence to guerrilla organizations.257 
The United Front against the Japanese was a gathering of the political left and 
various agrarian movements before and immediately after the Japanese invasion. Their 
purpose was to set aside political differences and create a “united front” against Japan. 
One of their contributions to the resistance was to elect a military committee 
representative of many of the different groups in the front.258 This was important because 
the members of the military committee came from pre-existing organizations that 
emerged for the purpose of resisting. The interaction between the group leaders 
developed interpersonal relationships that were able to bridge different organizations for 
the purpose of resistance to the Japanese. This was critical for three reasons. The 
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formation of the Huks from many previously developed groups gave the larger 
conglomerate organization a strong foundation.259 Second, the formation of a larger 
group gave the individual organizations a greater capacity to resist the Japanese.260 
Finally, the cohesive group was able to develop as an organization with a common 
narrative, greater discipline, and a robust “collective identity” that aided in the 
development of underground structures.261 
Before the invasion, in his capacity as “Field Marshall of Military Advisory to the 
Commonwealth Government of the Philippines,” MacArthur undertook to train the 
Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Army Reserve in a series of camps 
throughout Luzon. As the invading Japanese army moved south from Lingayen Bay, the 
Filipino soldiers retreated to Bataan, leaving the arms and ammunition in the camps. This 
equipment was taken and cached by many guerrilla groups immediately following the 
invasion, such as Walter Cushing262 and the Huk’s and their predecessors.263 This 
abandoned equipment in many cases represented the only means of industrial age 
resistance for the Filipinos and the isolated groups of soldiers.  
C. PHASE ONE: ORGANIZATION 
Following the Japanese invasion, guerrillas fell into several categories. 
Americans, civilian and service member alike, had four options: surrender to the 
Japanese, resist, attempt to hide in the mountains or among the population, or finally, to 
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attempt to escape to Australia.264 Filipinos guerrillas generally fell into two categories: 
bandits attempting to profit by the situation,265 or Filipino army officers organizing 
resistance.266 As isolated individuals and groups fled from the Japanese army they found 
one another, organized among a supportive Filipino population, and settled in for 
resistance.267 Ultimately, MacArthur’s 1945 campaign to liberate the archipelago would 
be supported by 182,000 organized and armed guerrillas, a network of 126 radio stations, 
and 27 weather-reporting stations.268  As will be demonstrated using the following four 
of the more prominent examples, across the five phases of the underground, organizing 
resistance was both pragmatic for reasons of survival as well as securing themselves from 
Japanese brutality.   
Two key observations should be noted in the first phase of underground 
development. First, the guerrillas emerged before the underground, and second, existing 
structures were used to develop the underground. After a few false starts the guerrillas 
largely began developing underground networks to sustain themselves with resources and 
information, as well as to buffer themselves against repression. This is consistent with 
Giap’s assertion269 that the underground must develop sufficiently before the guerrilla 
emerges in order that the whole might be resilient. 
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The second item is the use made of mobilizing structures270 in the development of 
the underground. In each of the cases reviewed in this chapter, the guerrilla forces used 
pre-existing structures, such as barrio leadership or labor organizations, to create an 
underground. In this manner, the guerrillas converted villages and tribes into large 
auxiliaries, in which cells could be established.271 All of these mobilizing structures 
come from formal and informal social networks.272 Passy notes three essential functions 
of social networks that are critical to the understanding of the embedded organizer in 
developing a resistance network: the socialization function, structural connection 
function, and decision shaping function.273 To paraphrase, individual participation in 
social networks will be indicative of the intensity of the individuals participation in the 
resistance network, interpersonal ties invoke culture and trust in recruiting new members, 
and the social network itself will give the potential recruit a model of “correct” social 
behavior.274  
Interpersonal relations between networks also facilitates resource mobilization, 
particularly in areas experiencing a great degree of state imposed order, or repression. 
According to Osa, in closed regimes social networks provide information with regards to 
safely navigating illicit systems, what the going rate is for bribing an official, for 
example. 275 Because of this sort of situation, social networks function as both “media” 
                                                 
270 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished 
draft, forthcoming in Special Warfare Magazine 26 (2013). In general mobilizing structures are the pre-
existing channels of communication, informal information exchange, traditional resource mobilization 
mediums, and methods of social exchange. 
271 Robert B. Baer, The Devil We Know, (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2008), 88. The case of 
the guerrillas organizing existing groups in the Philippines is similar to that of Hezbollah organizing 
existing groups in Lebanon, and later in Basra. 
272 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” in Islamic 
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2004), 9–13. 
273 Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter. But How?” in Social Movements and Networks, ed. 
Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 23–28. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Maryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish 
People’s Republic.”  In Social Movements and Networks, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104. 
  60 
and mobilization organization.276 By using pre-existing social networks this way, 
movement entrepreneurs can lower the information and transaction cost of resource 
mobilization. They can also maximize participation by manipulating the same social 
networks for demonstrations and other contentious actions.277 
 The effect of interpersonal relationships or the lack thereof is evident throughout 
this case study. The relationships developed by the united front before the occupation 
were critical to the development of the Huk movement; by contrast the Huks and the 
USAFFE guerrillas were unable to develop a relationship and as a consequence fought 
one another as much as the Japanese.278  
1. Structural Configuration in Phase One 
The organizations that formed the Huks were able to create a resilient network 
capable of resisting a determined occupying power, unburdened by rules of 
engagement.279 First, interpersonal relationships existed prior to the occupation. These 
interpersonal relationships bridged developed social networks, enabling the collective to 
resist occupation across a large portion of Luzon.280 Second, the individual groups had 
already developed a common narrative against the structures utilized by the Japanese to 
impose order.281 Third, when the military committee formed the Hukbalahap movement 
and expanded throughout central Luzon, a collective identity as a people in resistance 
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quickly developed as a result of the common narrative. Finally, the interpersonal 
relationships that developed outside of the united front, among other things, gave the 
Huks sufficient resiliency to survive the near dissolution of the formal organization of the 
united front.282 
Initially, the Huk organization at the Barrio level was indistinguishable from its 
KPMP or AMT roots. The chief function of the organization was in response to the 
power vacuum immediately following the Japanese invasion. First, the Japanese army 
moved through villages with great violence.283 Second, following the surrender of U.S. 
Forces in Bataan and Corregidor, Japanese soldiers and the Philippine Constabulary were 
pursuing guerrillas. This resulted in a situation where peasants were hiding in evacuation 
camps in the remote jungle and mountainous regions of the country. Because of this, 
there was no government apparatus to perform the routine functions of the state, 
including law enforcement; there was a great deal of Carabao rustling and looting, and 
the Huks stepped in to restore law and order to the rural countryside. 284  
In the first phase, the Huks had already organized themselves into five one 
hundred man squadrons. They had divided Central Luzon into five districts and assigned 
a squadron to each. Presiding over the five squadrons was a single echelon of command, 
the general headquarters, led by El Supremo, Luis Taruc along with three other 
community leaders from Central Luzon.285 This organization was able to effectively 
manage shadow government and offer the Japanese resistance because of the semi-
autonomous nature of the squads and squadrons. The absence of a centralized command 
and a rigid order-execution process allowed squad leaders at the barrio level to take as 
much or as little action as was appropriate to their situation. A squad with limited 
                                                 
282 Benedict J. Kerkvliet The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 99–104. The united front was quickly reduced to a few 
underground organizations with limited goals and abilities. Organizations like the PKP, or communist 
party, survived but were unable to wield control over the Huks. 
283 Ibid., 62–63. 
284 Ibid., 70. 
285 Benedict J. Kerkvliet The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 79–80. While Volckmann and Blackburn were still 
evading north, they were sheltered briefly by a local Huk commander and greatly impressed by their 
organization and discipline. 
  62 
ammunition or facing a heavy enemy presence would obviously have fewer operations 
than a resource and opportunity rich squad. The squad leaders were enabled to take action 
accordingly.286 This system of organization also offered the Huks a boost in resiliency. 
The fully developed system had a robust vertical hierarchy that started with the Barrio 
United Defense Corps, the underground system at the barrio level, its associated squad, 
the squadron and finally the command level. Horizontally, the system was replicated 
across central Luzon, making the Huk movement itself very resilient to repression. 
The other two types of guerrilla organizations, sanctioned and semi sanctioned 
groups under Colonel Thorpe and the independent movements of Volckmann and Fertig 
established themselves at a less ambitious rate than the Huks. The guerrilla movements 
established by these officers was initially isolated groups of two or three attempting to, 
“Do any damn thing but surrender.”287 These small groups eventually coalesced in 
evacuation camps in the rugged hinterlands, where Filipinos and American businessmen 
and their families were hiding from the Japanese. 288   
It was these camps that transitioned soldiers and officers into guerrillas by 
bringing them together and directing them to other guerrilla organizations. Volckmann 
and Blackburn were guided to Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble through the 
evacuation camps,289 and how Lieutenant Ramsey was able to get a copy of the book of 
Mao’s writings on guerrilla warfare that inspired his own organization.290  
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Evacuation camps provided for a safe haven for the guerrilla or underground 
organizer. Although it was happenstance291 and fantastic fortune292 that evading groups 
of soldiers found safe haven among the civilian population in the hinterlands, it was 
nevertheless a key organizational structure that funneled soldiers into nascent guerrilla 
organizations. These remote camps were a good example of the safe haven called for by 
Maoist doctrine, and very similar to Mao’s own remote mountain camps during his 
revolution. 
2. Intelligence and Recruitment in Phase One 
Intelligence in the first phase was as a result of the ‘“bamboo telegraph,’” a 
system whereby designated runners would carry news and gossip from one village to the 
next.293 This information supply chain brought a great deal of false intelligence, but it 
was also how the USAFFE guerrilla bands received word about other guerrilla 
organizations that were forming.294  
This is an example of an emerging underground taking advantage of an organic, 
informal channel to protect itself from state repression. Using this system of transferring 
information from village to village, the underground was able to leverage an existing 
capability, invisible to the counterinsurgency force, to transfer intelligence. 295 Cunning 
guerrilla leaders such as Volckmann and Blackburn were also able to leverage this for 
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counterintelligence purposes, by feeding it misinformation intended to be fed into the 
Japanese intelligence cycle.296 
In the organizational phase, the Japanese forces were still violently repressing the 
civilian population, and as such the greatest security threat to the isolated groups of 
guerrillas and Huks alike was avoiding Japanese patrols. Interaction between the 
emerging resistance groups was high as movement entrepreneurs297 like Volckmann and 
Taruc encountered one another in evacuation camps and during movements.298 
Volckmann and Blackburn’s interaction with the Thorpe organization caused them to 
reject his preference for Americans and seek recruits from the Igorot tribes;299 The Huk’s 
interaction with the USAFFE organizations led them to take pride in their preference for 
continuous engagement with the Japanese.300 
The USAFFE and USFIP guerrilla organizations had a large number of early 
volunteers, but a majority of these were interested in establishing camps and waiting out 
the war, such as the soldiers at the Faussett camp described by Blackburn.301 The Huks 
had a slightly different variation of the same problem; initially anyone could join a Huk 
group. This led to discipline issues wherein new members would abuse their new status 
as a guerrilla and a man with a gun.302 It also created a situation that allowed the 
organization to be infiltrated by informers. In response to this, the Huk’s placed new 
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members on probation and restricted guns to experienced, trusted members. This 
ultimately resulted in an increase in popularity and discipline within the ranks.303  
3. Summary of Guerrilla Groups in Phase One 
The dispersed nature of the evading soldiers was also instrumental in aiding the 
guerrilla in favor of the Japanese. First, pursuing the small groups took soldiers and 
resources away from consolidating the Japanese occupation. Second, two or three 
evading soldiers were not particularly burdensome on the civilian population. They could 
be housed, fed, and guided on to the next evacuation camp or village without undue risk 
to the community that they imposed upon. These groups were not acting in coordination. 
Rather they had decided individually that they would not surrender and they would resist 
the Japanese efforts at governance and calls for surrender.  
The account of Walter Cushing is interesting in that, while he did kill over a 
thousand Japanese soldiers and destroy a sizeable amount of equipment, he also 
recognized that when the USAFFE surrendered, further overt resistance on his part was 
futile. Rather than continuing his assaults on Japanese garrisons he dispersed his forces 
into small bands to maintain resistance and gather intelligence. This deliberate delay in 
resistance allowed the Japanese to fall into a routine and allowed Cushing to mobilize 
resources through his contacts in Manila and establish cells throughout Luzon. By 
contrast, the Huk insistence on immediate action against the Japanese earned them 
immediate reprisals, via the “Zona” technique, whereby the Japanese would surround a 
barrio with 30 to 40 men, detain anyone suspicious, and take them off for torture and 
imprisonment.304 
Security in phase one was largely nonexistent for each of the groups reviewed 
above. Volckmann’s organization in this phase had made one aborted attempt to seize a 
collaborator, the results of which were Japanese pursuit of him and his staff in the 
mountains of north Luzon. During the pursuit, through the use of a local “spotter” 
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Volckmann discovered that the Japanese were searching for Blackburn and himself by 
name. The realization taught him that there were informers in his organization, and that 
he could do little about it;305 from that point on, he made it operational policy to tell the 
locals that he was doing the opposite of what he intended. Likewise the Huks learned that 
a poor screening process would bring Japanese collaborators into the squadron at worst, 
at best some recruits alienated the local population through a lack of discipline.306 
The first phase in this case study is heavy with activists, or what are referred to 
social movement theory lexicon as movement entrepreneurs. Movement entrepreneurs 
are active, full-time movement developers that facilitate the development of bridging 
structures between networks; the goal is the maximization of participation in the 
movement.307 In the examples of Ramsey and Volckmann, each initially began to expand 
his organization by contacting local, informal civil leadership in the communities within 
their respective areas of operation; once contact was made they combined the resources 
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Figure 1.  Guerrillas in the Philippines, 1942–1945308  
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D. PHASE TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE 
Following the surrender of USAFFE forces309 and the subsequent Bataan Death 
March, the Japanese army turned to the business of occupation. In April 1942, the 
Japanese restricted the unmitigated violence by soldiers against civilians, and circulated 
leaflets directing civilians to return from evacuation camps to the barrios, and plant their 
crops. A Filipino puppet government was established, schools were re-opened, taxes 
imposed, and the Japanese brought in agricultural experts to improve productivity. Since 
the Japanese were not interfering with property rights, the absentee landlords moved to 
Manila, and supported the puppet government, leaving the rural farm and hinterland areas 
for the disparate guerrilla outfits and the Japanese to fight over.310  
This turn to governance generally marked the transition from the organizational 
phase to the psychological offensive phase in the development of the underground. Once 
USAFFE guerrillas like Ramsey and Thorpe established camps and chains of commands 
they set about establishing operational and intelligence cells without delay.311 
Independent guerrillas such as Volckmann and Richardson fell under existing chains of 
command; Wendell Fertig promoted himself to general and assumed command of nearby 
Filipino guerrillas and bands of outlaws.312   
When the Japanese directed that civilians return to the barrio, they also directed 
them to establish “neighborhood associations” that were responsible for monitoring and 
reporting on the activities of neighbors,313 which the Huks gladly established. The 
neighborhood associations that Huks established gave the illusion of compliance, while 
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providing a cover for subversive activities; this was the basic element of the Huk 
underground organization.314 
Resistance organizations form exclusive insider groups as shields against state 
repression. Exclusive groups allow the organization to overcome the states use of 
informants, compartmentalize the organization against state action, and facilitate 
clandestine activity.315 In the previous examples of organizational development, the 
growing compartmentalization allowed the guerrillas to reduce the effectiveness of 
informers. It also allowed a gradual inclusion process to develop, whereby recruits would 
move through lower echelons of the system in a transmission belt fashion, rising through 
the organization as appropriate. 
1. Establishing Cells in Phase Two 
Guerrilla organizations, from 1942 until the liberation in 1944, generally fell into 
one of two operational categories: intelligence gathering for MacArthur, or conducting 
operations against the Japanese.316 Volckmann and Ramsey fell decidedly into the first 
camp, and the Huks decidedly in the latter; Colonel Kangleon’s outfit conducted both out 
of necessity, in response to Japanese counter-insurgency efforts.317 All of the guerrillas 
found themselves administering civil government in one form or another, requiring a 
different series of cells to be established.318 
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a. Intelligence gathering  
MacArthur’s guidance to Thorpe was to organize the civilian population, 
gather intelligence, and prepare to support his return; in doing so, the Luzon guerrilla 
organization did not lack volunteers. Cells within Manila were established to gather 
intelligence and resources, cells-in-a-series were established as couriers to move 
information overland to meet U.S. submarines, and transfer information to MacArthur in 
Australia, and distribute resources to rural guerrillas.319 Common between these cells is 
the utilization of traditional practices, such as coastal spotters watching for ships and 
relaying news or runners moving information between villages, into the underground.320  
b. Operational Cells 
In this phase, the operational cells were focused on propaganda and 
resource mobilization. In the north, Volckmann organized voluntary labor units under 
local leadership, called “Bolo Battalions,”321 by issuing a call to support his guerrilla 
staff to local village leaders. Initially, his call for support was to rebuild an old sawmill, 
fix phone lines connecting other former sawmill-guerrilla camps, and to provide material 
support in the form of food and other dry goods. In return, he offered I.O.U. vouchers to 
be reimbursed upon liberation.322 This is an example of effective bloc recruitment, where 
rather than recruit individuals into assisting the organization, Volckmann was able to 
leverage his credibility as a U.S. Army officer to gain collective support from local 
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communities. Similarly, Ramsey formed his initial intelligence network by reaching out 
to nearby communities to establish cells. 
In this phase, both Ramsey and Cushing had established cells for receiving 
information from San Francisco via radio. The information from these broadcasts was 
then distributed in newsletters that had not been censored by the Japanese. In addition to 
being a news source, they vilified the occupying army, and called for local support to the 
guerrillas.323 
Fertig, a civilian civil-engineer in the reserves, had thought ahead of time 
to secure the components for a radio transmitter, an encoding device, and scrounged parts 
for a telegraph. While attempting to bring all of the guerrillas, outlaws, and unaffiliated 
resistors in Mindanao under his command, he established a cell consisting of an Army 
Air Corp soldier and two radio operators from the Navy. This cell eventually contacted 
San Francisco and General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Headquarters.324 
2. The Psychological Contest for Popular Support  
The Huks established a cultural and information committee headed by Jaun Feleo. 
It was responsible for organizing skits, songs, and short dramas to be performed by a 
group traveling between barrios as a means to counter Japanese propaganda and boost 
civilian morale. The committee also issued a newsletter that praised the Huks, denigrated 
fascism and the Japanese, and praised the coming liberation by American arms.325 These 
mobile Huk morale organizations were good examples of employing what Lenin referred 
to as going among the people agitators and organizers,326 and what Giap would refer to 
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as an armed propaganda team.327 These were effective for two reasons. First, they 
demonstrated to communities that the resistance movement was taking action. Second, 
demonstrating that a resistance movement was organized and taking action contributed to 
cognitive liberation among the civilian population.328 This was done by diffusing the idea 
that the Japanese were being fought and that there was hope for the future. 
All of these early propaganda efforts were important early efforts at framing. 
Framing is the process by which the resistance movement develops interpretive schemata 
that define the world by simplifying it into “who we are,” “who they are,” “and what 
happens next.” This is how movements attempt to connect with other movements and 
aids in the development of the movement’s narrative.329 The efforts to publish 
newsletters, spread information via runners and propaganda teams were important to the 
development of the resistance because they informed other less developed groups or 
isolated groups of would-be resistors that they were not alone, that they could resist 
occupation, and that MacArthur would return. This increased the development of 
cognitive liberation among the civilian population. 
Colonel Kangleon, the guerrilla leader on Leyte that was to later fall under 
General Fertig’s organization, organized a self-sufficient organization,330 in a region 
overrun with other “guerrillas” that looted villages at gun point, made speeches, and left 
for the hills. The Japanese were content to allow the guerrillas to alienate the population, 
and took no early action to restore order. Kangleon’s fair practices with the civilian 
population, as well as his status as the only native Filipino to serve in the pre-war army as 
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a division commander, gave his outfit credibility with the population as a legitimate 
organization for liberation.331 
Recognizing the need to maintain contact with the guerrillas and civilians, 
MacArthur went to great lengths to ship propaganda items via submarine to the guerrillas 
Typically such match books and cigarettes had “I shall return – MacArthur” stamped on 
them. Included was the Free Philippines magazine produced by the 8th Army 
psychological warfare branch as well as other supplies such as small arms, ammunition, 
and boots.332By comparison the Japanese spent little time attempting to generate public 
support. Japanese soldiers would tell villagers that they were there to liberate them during 
operations333 Japanese engineers conducted agricultural programs and other civic 
projects intended to increase the productivity of the country.334 
The repressive methods utilized by the Japanese army in general, and the 
Kempeitai in particular, generated a great deal of what Hess and Martin refer to as 
“backfire.”335 Repression used by the state in order to impose order can be viewed as 
unjust by the population, resulting in massive public outrage and contributing to mass 
mobilization.336 The Japanese attempts at civic projects were seen, rightfully, as an 
attempt to make a colony more profitable.337 The Japanese counter-insurgency efforts 
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consisted of enlisting the former Philippine Constabulary, the traditional enemy of the 
rural Filipino,338 creating a network of informants and puppet officials,339and taking 
hostages from families to force compliance, and confiscating property.340 
Japanese efforts at governance also failed to win the psychological battle in the 
rural farmlands. The puppet government that the Japanese set up was comprised of many 
relatives of the absentee landlord class that moved to Manila to avoid the fighting. So 
long as property rights were unmolested, the landed elite had an incentive to support the 
pro-Japanese government.341 Unfortunately for the Japanese, this was also the class that 
had given rise to the predecessors of the Hukbalahap movement during the 1930s, and 
certainly was not going to garner support from the tenant farmers and peasants during the 
occupation.342  
Finally, Japanese propaganda fell largely under the “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.” This rested on the idea that Japanese were superior and thus the 
natural leaders of East Asia.343 The East Asian war itself was being fought for the 
betterment of all East Asian races. The Japanese used a combination of carrots and sticks 
in attempting to pacify the Filipinos. At the puppet government level, this included 
promises for independence and threats for cooperation with the Americans. 344 The 
Japanese propaganda efforts toward the civilian population were generally limited to 
making ridiculous claims.345Japanese efforts at an information campaign directed toward 
the Philippine Citizenry failed to resonate at nearly all levels. As noted by David Snow 
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and several others, participation in a social movement requires the correct interpretation 
of grievance, frame alignment, and narrative maintenance.346  
3. Summary of Guerrilla Groups in Phase Two 
MacArthur’s mandate to the guerrillas, known as the “lay low order” put strong 
emphasis on gathering intelligence, organizing the civilian population, and avoiding 
contact with the enemy.347 In executing this, Ramsey and Volckmann’s organizations 
spent a great deal of time organizing cells for the transmission of information and getting 
the local population involved in supporting the organization with labor and other low risk 
activities. This initial support was similar in nature to the Viet Cong approach to 
recruiting, by involving recruits initially in small tasks, and then increasingly difficult or 
dangerous tasks over time. By gathering the peasants together in work details, people 
became accustomed to providing support to the guerrillas. This was also the early 
development of redundant layers in the organization; as guerrilla leaders developed 
bridging structures to civic leaders they effectively created subordinate organizations, and 
additional buffering layers that would allow the organization as a whole to absorb 
repression. 
The tertiary effect of avoiding contact with the Japanese was the deliberate delay 
effect noted in the first phase. By concentrating on propaganda and peasant mobilization 
without giving the Japanese cause for alarm (as compared to the Huks, who were actively 
attacking the Japanese) allowed the Japanese to either becomes lackadaisical in matters of 
security or to simply focus their attention elsewhere. This also allowed the nascent groups 
to develop their respective frames through interaction with the population without 
invoking repression from the Japanese. 
The guerrilla bands avoided predatory practices with the civilian population, 
greatly increasing their credibility. The Huks were known to pay either in pesos for food 
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and supplies or even share their own food.348Colonel Kangleon’s early organization was 
largely self-sufficient in terms of sustaining themselves with the basic necessities by 
farming in their remote camps, and even selling homemade soap.349 Blackburn’s 
Headhunters partially supported themselves by weaving baskets and chicken coops from 
rattan and selling them in Antipolo.350 Ramsey went so far in regards to protecting the 
population from deprivation, that he restricted action to small acts of sabotage and 
avoided any grand acts of violence that would put the population at risk of reprisal.351 
Combined with the advantage of popular support stemming from harsh Japanese 
repression, resource sufficiency greatly enhanced the operational independence of the 
underground. As a result, the Japanese’ population control measure had little impact on 
the underground’s ability to continue operations.    
Early propaganda efforts alerted potential guerrilla recruits that there were means 
of resistance at hand, and that the United States was not going to abandon the Philippines, 
despite Japanese propaganda. Likewise, the Huk propaganda efforts caused the rural 
population to know that there was a purpose to resistance. The support from MacArthur, 
as a link to the outside world and unavailable consumer and guerrilla goods, in the 
propaganda phase contributed greatly to countering Japanese propaganda; another 
productive result of MacAthur’s support and communication was a second newsletter 
produced by Volckmann for the guerrillas, in which he related Allied milestones in the 
Atlantic and his personal communication with MacArthur.352 By establishing the 
propaganda cells early on, the guerrillas were able to contribute to preventing the 
Japanese propaganda effort from gaining resonance among the population. 
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E. PHASE THREE: EXPANSION 
In the case of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, the expansion phase 
saw the most activity and organization. The Japanese had lost the counter insurgency 
initiative as guerrilla outfits and underground cells formed in the country side and within 
Manila, and MacArthur was able to run submarines with supplies through blockades in 
support of the resistance. 
Two significant events in this phase are the expansion of the guerrilla 
organizations into shadow government and the use of embedded movement entrepreneurs 
for bloc recruitment. Embeddedness is the degree to which early organizers and recruited 
members are involved in social networks within a given community.353 First, an 
organizer embedded in formal and informal networks enjoys a corresponding degree of 
authority and influence in the community. 354 Embedded organizers also have the ability 
to recruit entire social networks from within the network, as opposed to either recruiting 
individuals or soliciting organizations from the outside. 355 There is likewise an increase 
in resilience as a result of the amount of networks that an organizer is embedded in. 
Second, breadth of network membership grants access to a corresponding level of 
resource mobilization allowing for greater levels of collaboration and, dispersion of the 
risk. 356 When the risk is dispersed and collectivized, it is easier to achieve a “cognitive 
liberation,” which in turn can make the movement more sustainable.357   
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1. Recruiting and Security in Phase Three 
The Huks learned from their early experiences that recruiting for the guerrilla 
force and the underground had to be selective. Early discipline problems as well as 
informants infiltrating as a result of non-selective recruitment were solved by instituting a 
probationary policy for new recruits, and tighter discipline in general, increasing their 
popularity with the people.358 By increasing the recruiting standards and discipline of 
Huk guerrillas, they also increased their collective identity as “soldiers defending the 
people from abuse” and increased the resonance of their narrative with the people they 
undertook to defend against abuse. 
As Ramsay and Volckmann instituted a regimental system within their respective 
areas, security was increased as native members of regiments were assigned to a district. 
The location of the regimental camps was known only to the members of the regiment, 
and information came from couriers.359 This not only increased security by 
compartmentalizing the organization, it also increased the organizations capacity for 
steering the movement and bridging geographical networks by freeing upper echelons 
from the routine tasks of the lower echelons. 
The courier system Volckmann instituted established relay stations in the jungles 
and mountains also increased security. Each relay station was managed by a sergeant, 
who would verify the identity of the courier and verify the veracity of the message being 
relayed. Within each relay station was a cell of couriers, the couriers to be switched 
between stations to protect the identity and location of the next relay station and its 
staff.360 
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Volckmann and Blackburn recruited among the various Igorot tribes in the sub 
province of Ifugao, by living in the various barrios. Aided by Bruno,361 the pair would 
appeal to individual tribal leaders and the mayors of the various barrios. In this manner, 
Volckmann was able to recruit large blocs of guerrillas and underground supporters to his 
side.362 By living among the tribes and taking active part in their lives and activities, the 
pair acted as movement entrepreneurs and effectively embedded themselves deeply into 
the tribal network. They were able to leverage this embeddedness to recruit entire tribes, 
bringing with them their organic command structures and organizational practices. 
Through Colonel Kangleon, General Fertig utilized a similar technique in Leyte. 
Fertig’s guidance to Kangleon was that first there must be unification, followed by 
recognized civil government in the name of President-in-Exile Quezon. With recognition, 
they could print legal tender backed by Quezon’s exile government in Australia.363With 
this in mind, Kangleon reached out to the other guerrilla leaders in Leyte, and with 
threats and persuasion managed to join their groups to his, with one exception.364 This 
expansion of the guerrilla organizations into shadow government increased the 
organizational security as civic leaders were appointed, increasing the organizational 
depth of the resistance.  
Edwin Ramsey recruited Filipino’s into intelligence cells and into the guerrilla 
force by contacting the community leaders in local barrios.365 While not embedded in the 
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communities, Ramsey was still able to conduct bloc recruitment by leveraging his status 
as a U.S. Army officer with community leaders.  
2. Network Expansion in Phase Three 
Operational cell networks expanded in this phase, allowing existing operational 
cells connect with one another. This situation enabled guerrilla networks to begin to 
operate as cells-in-a-series. In this operating style, a cell would perform a specific 
function, such as receiving information from a radio transmitter. The information would 
be relayed to another cell that would print the information, while yet another cell would 
distribute.366 An example of this is the coastal spotter and courier organization. 
Information on enemy troop and ship movements was received from spotters via courier 
networks, and transmitted to the Pacific South West Command.367 News about the war 
and pending liberation would be transmitted back to the radio cells, and sent by courier 
network to another cell that would feed information into a manufactory process.368 The 
information would be processed through a cell-in-a-series manufactory that would type 
the news in one cell, print copies in another, and distribute via courier network.369 
a. Spotters and Couriers 
Coastal organizations, notably Fertig’s, made great use of the Filipino 
tradition of coastal spotters, who would watch for ship and plane movements, chart 
minefields, and report on the weather. When transmitters were available and working, the 
cells would transmit the information via radio.370 When they were not, vast lines of 
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couriers, costly in terms of manpower and opportunity costs would march the information 
over land to pre-designated submarine landings, when the information could be passed 
along to the submarine crew.371 
b. Manufactories 
The greatest common problem before the submarines could reliably run 
the Japanese blockades, were small arms and ammunition. Initially the guerrillas captured 
weapons and ammunition from the Japanese using stores liberated from abandoned 
training camps.372 When that ran out, manufactory cells were established to create them. 
Other requirements for items such as fuel, a telegraph system, batteries, and eventually 
printing currency were established in a similar manner: the guerrillas would find 
somebody that knew the rudimentary work that needed to be done, train some other 
members, and then produce goods until the war was over or the Japanese stopped 
production.373 In Colonel Kangleon’s guerrilla network, U.S. Navy Lieutenant 
Richardson established cells that scavenged for items that could be used for bullet 
cartridges, brass curtain rods, for example. These were brought to another cell that cut 
them to fit, and then moved them to another cell that assembled the bullet. Powder and 
projectiles were scavenged by other cells that retrieved powder from a wide variety of 
sources. 374 
Increasing the activities of cells to the greatest possible extent increased 
the ability of the resistance organizations as a whole. By involving as much of the 
population as possible, there is a corresponding increase in support for the movement as 
participants develop a vested interest as a result of the effort expended on behalf of the 
                                                 
371 Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to 
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373 Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 152–
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374 Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 143–
145. In this example, the author describes native guerrillas dragging a volatile and unstable naval mine 
from the ocean and cracking it open with rudimentary tools. 
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organization.375 Second, this represents an increase in the redundancy of the 
organization; as new redundant cells are created to perform routine functions, the 
organization as a whole can more readily absorb repression. Finally, the participation of 
an increasing number of people has a corresponding increase in cognitive liberation. 
3. Civil Government 
As mentioned earlier, the key to gaining status and external support as a guerrilla 
organization was establishing a recognized civil government; “even if it’s only governing 
twelve nipa huts and a tin outhouse…”376 There were two types of civil governance that 
the guerrillas instituted. First, the regimental districting emplaced by the USAFFE 
guerrillas began administering barrios by default, as the local power brokers.377 The 
Huks and other Filipino led organizations, such as Kangleon’s purposefully established 
shadow governments in either an attempt to restore rule of law, gain recognition as an 
official representative of the government-in-exile, or both.  
The Huks had originally created neighborhood associations to both placate the 
Japanese and provide cover for subversive activities. As the regionally based Huk 
squadrons expanded and developed more control over their regions, they converted the 
neighborhood associations clandestinely into Barrio United Defense Corps. The Defense 
Corps were responsible for gathering resources and providing support to the guerrilla 
squadrons. These in turn began to provide civil administration to the barrios that they 
defended, in the form of baptisms, weddings, jury trials, and the issuance of official 
documents.378This organization assumed control over civil society, replaced the political 
organization with new symbols of authority, and developed institutions that exercised 
                                                 
375 Michael Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of 
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377 Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to 
Guerrilla Commander (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 180. 
378 Benedict J. Kerkvliet The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94–96. 
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control over the individual; this is the definition of shadow government.379This structure 
also established an underground wherein those not suited to guerrilla work can participate 
in the resistance to the extent of their capacity. As the underground spans civil society in 
a given region the collective identity and a village in resistance emerges. 
Kangleon’s Filipino shadow government used its legal authority to appoint 
municipal functionaries and a police force. The chief function of the government was 
enforcing the loyalty tax, which was used for civil projects like roads and telegraphs, and 
mobilizing resources in response to guerrilla need.380 
As Ramsey’s control over northern Luzon grew, his ability to manipulate the 
politics of the puppet government increased. By encouraging underground members to 
run for office he was able to control several seats in the national assembly. When the 
Japanese pressured the assembly to vote for war against the United States, the 
underground members holding office were able to successfully block the vote and 
Japanese political warfare effort.381 Ramsey took this action based on his interpretation 
of MacArthur’s “lay low” order; he saw no benefit to fighting the puppet government, 
and reasoned that infiltrating could prove useful.  
4. Developing Public Support 
Two critical factors for generating public support in this case study was the 
presence and actions of American guerrillas in remote villages increased public support 
for the guerrilla’s effort against the Japanese. First, guerrillas demonstrated leadership in 
resource mobilization by actively organizing the local population in productive, 
subversive tasks.382 By establishing civil governance and avoiding predatory practices 
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when mobilizing resources,383 guerrilla organizations were also able to generate public 
support. Taking action against the Japanese for psychological purposes384 also 
demonstrated that the guerrilla force was growing and would be successful, also 
contributed to public support. 
This case study has two examples of actions failing to develop public support. 
First was the “lay low” order given by MacArthur to the USAFFE guerrillas, who were 
intentionally avoiding taking large actions against the Japanese.385 The Huk’s, however, 
were as actively engaging the Japanese as resources would allow.386 The second was the 
recruitment by USAFFE groups, of guerrillas that had been rejected by the Huks.387 
These two actions not only failed to develop public support for the USAFFE organization 
in Central Luzon, but also led to significant fighting between the two organizations.388 
5. Summary of Guerrilla Groups in Phase Three 
Bloc recruitment served each of the guerrilla organizations in several different 
ways. For the Huks recruiting from within the already established KPMP and AMT 
brought large groups of organized peasants in the barrio under guerrilla leadership. For 
Kangleon’s organization bloc recruitment brought guerrilla organizations and the regions 
that they controlled under their leadership and expanded their ability to mobilize 
resources, gather intelligence for Southwest Pacific Command, and conduct operations 
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against the Japanese. Volckmann was able to bring entire tribes into his organization for 
the cost of living among the jungle tribes and cannibals of the Ifugao province, and 
Ramsey was able to establish intelligence cells in nearby communities by dealing directly 
with civic leaders. The process of bloc recruitment by dealing with previously organized 
groups was far more efficient than the individual recruitment conducted in the first phase, 
without the associated security risk; the security concerns of a barrio mayor or an 
independent guerrilla organization can largely be presumed to have been in existence 
before the organization was recruited.   
Probationary recruitment increased the reputation of the Hukbalahap movement 
by reducing discipline problems, and weeding out unfit members before they can do 
damage. For a group that did not have the legitimacy of the Quezon government or the 
United States military, nor the external support of MacArthur’s submarines and supplies, 
legitimacy was critical to both sustainment and operations. The participation in the 
gradual vetting process of the Huk organization contributed to a collective identity as 
individual members acknowledged the behavioral norms and participated in the more 
disciplined system. 
Using the development of civil society in the advancement of the underground 
contributed in several ways. First, civilians not inclined or physically unable to 
participate in guerrilla activities or even arduous underground activities can contribute 
through the administration of the population. Second contributing to the shadow 
government, while perhaps not as risky as participating in guerrilla operations or charting 
sea mines, has the effect of creating a situation wherein the individual has participated 
and through the expenditure of personal effort will have a vested interest in seeing the 
effort to be successful. Finally, sharing the burden of the underground and the guerrilla 
force creates a collective identity and substitutes for a social network in which 
participants identify themselves as part of a group. Cialdini observed that when in doubt 
people look to the group or community as a whole for a model of correct behavior. The 
principle of “social proof,” as he calls it, has the potential to offer other organizations an 
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opportunity to participate simply because “everyone is doing it.”389 Increasing 
participation increases the “rightness” of what is happening. 
F. PHASES FOUR AND FIVE: MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION 
In the final phases, the guerrilla groups that had not been conducting aggressive 
action took two steps critical to expanding their efforts; the exception to this is the 
Hukbalahap’s, who had been taking action against the Japanese from the beginning.390 
The first step was organizing their respective regions into districts with a leadership 
hierarchy. The second was to mobilize the guerrillas into regiments and assign them to 
districts.391 Organizing into regionally based regiments increased security by 
compartmentalizing information; locations and identities only being known to those 
assigned to the regiment. The regimental system also took a greater hand in shadow 
government within their respective regions. This increased the control of the guerrilla by 
giving the organization greater depth vertically, from the lowest level in the village to the 
higher chains of command. 
1. Sabotage, Demolition, and Localized Fighting 
As the liberation drew near, MacArthur’s staff demanded a greater amount of 
intelligence from the guerrilla organizations as well as an increase in violence and 
sabotage: 
“MacArthur to Ramsey, starting immediately, destroy enemy wire 
communications, railroad tracks, rolling stock and trucks, planes 
concealed in dispersal areas, ammunition, oil and supply dumps…unleash 
maximum possible violence against the enemy…”392 
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Ramsey responded by sending saboteurs into the lubricant factories and docks of 
Manila, destroying several hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel and lubricant oil, as 
well as sinking two ships and damaging another.393 In August of 1944, Volckmann sent 
Southwest Pacific Command his targeting priorities in advance of the liberation army – 
supplies and logistics, critical infrastructure, and ambushing patrols. The purpose of this 
was to maintain Japanese attention in order to prevent them from concentrating on 
defending the island, and to erode as much of their fighting strength as possible.394 
Kangleon had started offensive operations as early as February, 1944, with a series of 
ambushes and raids in Leyte, resulting in months of pre-invasion back and forth fighting 
with Japanese garrisons.395 
2. Fighting Under Sixth Army 
When MacArthur’s forces began retaking the Philippines, the sanctioned 
guerrillas were fed and supplied, and became a conventional fighting force under 6th 
Army, fighting conventionally from June to September of 1945, when General Yamashita 
surrendered. The Huk’s, vaguely communist and pro-American at this point, were neither 
made a conventional force nor disarmed. MacArthur’s attitude toward the Hukbalahap 
movement was seemingly confused.396 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
In the case of resistance of the Japanese in the Philippines, the guerrilla emerged 
in response to the Japanese occupation, prior to the development of the underground. 
After a period of evasion, guerrilla organizations coalesced and began developing 
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underground structures from pre-existing social and political structures to support the 
guerrilla force. Operational and intelligence cells were created within those structures in 
order to further facilitate operations until the allied liberation of the archipelago.  
There are two key differences in the development of resistance in this case study, 
and that of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. First, the emergence 
of the guerrilla and the development of the underground occur in the opposite order. The 
NLF infiltrated cadre into villages and slowly developed clandestine organizations until 
an underground had fully developed prior to the emergence of a guerrilla. In the 
Philippines, the sudden emergence of the guerrilla force preceded a gradual development 
of the underground.  
Second, the NLF underground systematically removed traditional leadership and 
civil society, and replaced them with a civil affairs committee and liberation associations. 
In the Philippines, guerrillas recruited village leadership into the underground, and used 
the existing social networks and their mobilization structures to support underground and 
guerrilla efforts. 
While the methodology in establishing shadow government differs in each of 
these examples, the guerrillas establishing shadow government as a crucial step in 
building resistance highlights the need for a robust underground movement capable of 
supporting guerrilla warfare. This underscores Molnar’s assertion that the guerrilla 
ideally emerges in later phases of resistance development. Supporting the guerrilla force 
with recruits and supplies requires a certain amount of self-deprivation on the part of the 
population.397 For the population to voluntarily deprive themselves requires consensus 
building. The guerrilla bands in this case study emerged as a result of the occupation, and 
so building underground structures that develop consensus was not possible. Establishing 
the different forms of shadow government in communities by the guerrillas imposed 
behavioral norms and degree of participation upon the population. Adherence to 
behavioral norms and participation in the system begins cultivating a socialization 
function, where the individual’s interpretive frame is shaped through participation in a 
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network. Once involved in the network, the individual defines and redefines interpretive 
frames and create a political consciousness with regards to the organization;398 in this 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The general components of an unconventional warfare campaign are the guerrilla 
force and the underground. U.S. Army doctrine is primarily focused on the development 
of the guerrilla force in unconventional warfare campaigns. The focus of this thesis has 
been to supplement that doctrine with a comprehensive review of resistance efforts for a 
standard list of practices in developing the underground. The primary lessons for the 
underground are distilled by comparing a revolutionary movement against a standing 
government apparatus with a resistance movement against an occupying power.  
In developing an underground, there five phases: organization, psychological 
offensive, expansion, militarization, and consolidation. Of these five, the first three are 
where the movement is more vulnerable to repression; the remaining two where the 
movement is less susceptible to the state’s ability to disrupt the movement. Each 
geographic area or element of the underground movement does not necessarily need to be 
in the same phase as the others. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED: 
1. Pre-Organization 
In developing the underground, three fundamental pre-requisites must be met 
before the operator moves into the organizational phase. First, a grievance must be 
identified that impacts a large segment of the population. Second, the operator must 
develop a solution that requires an underground and justifies illegal action. Finally, an 
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organization, such as agitation-propaganda teams, must be created. These teams would 
then develop the revolutionary doctrine through interaction with the population.399 
a. Doctrine 
Generally, individuals do not wholly commit themselves to a movement 
all at once, particularly in illegal underground movements. The decision to participate in 
a movement will be influenced by the social networks in the individual participant’s life 
before a decision is made. Where familial and friendship networks may discourage or 
encourage participation, religious or social networks may do the opposite.400A doctrine 
can more easily penetrate social networks and influence this process when they have 
expansive bodies of literature that can be broken down into small portions that are 
applicable to many circumstances. In this manner, many social networks circulate 
portions of the doctrine, exposing many to it in a positive manner and protecting it from 
scrutiny.401 An example of this in the case study is Mao’s writing that was circulating the 
Philippines during the Japanese occupation.402 A more recent example is Anwar al 
Awlaki’s, 44 ways to support Jihad, wherein he called upon readers to “fight the lies of 
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the Western Media, to spread the writings of Jihad, and guide others to the truth.”403 
Doctrine reduced to small portions in this way can also cause potential participants to 
begin participating in gradual increments, such as donating money to Jihad, 404by 
creating a commitment and consistency effect.405A doctrine is also fuel for group 
solidarity by invoking Henri Tajfel’s minimum group paradigm, made famous as the 
Granfalloon technique by Kurt Vonnegut.406 Even a simple narrative utilizing Tugwell’s 
Mobilization Trinity407 will create a sense of solidarity pitting resistance members against 
non-believers.  
In the first case study, it was noted that there was a substantial number of 
nationalist movements emerging and subsequently succumbing to suppression during the 
1920s and 1930s. It was during this period that Ho Chi Minh discovered and fused 
Leninism and anti-colonialist nationalism in his quest for an independent Vietnam,408 not 
for love of a proletarian utopia, but for a unifying doctrine with which to weld together 
the divergent, quarreling factions. Ho’s early writing, the Road to Revolution, put 
ideology to practical use and aided in consolidating groups into the Revolutionary Youth 
League. 409 The Road to Revolution assigned colonialism the blame for the country’s 
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difficulties, declared that the answer was mobilizing the agrarian peasantry, and called on 
the other political and revolutionary factions to join the Revolutionary Youth League. 
This was an example of a frame alignment that enjoyed a high degree of resonance with 
the target audience.  
Two narratives were used in the second case study. First, the Huks made 
use of the writings of Mao Tse Tung that had filtered through the Philippine Communist 
Party to the Hukbalahap, and even to Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey.410 Second, for the 
USAFFE and the USAFIP, MacArthur’s promise to return, as well as President Qezon’s 
government in exile, served the purpose of a doctrine around which resistance could 
coalesce. This observation is supported by Volckmann’s ability to mobilize support with 
the credibility of his rank as a commissioned officer in the United States Army.411 
Similarly, Fertig invoked both MacArthur and Qezon when he presented himself as a 
“general officer” and representative of the legitimate government in exile.412 In both 
cases, potential members of the underground are presented with a choice between the two 
main combatants.413 A more significant point in this case study is that of the two frames 
that failed to gain traction. First, was the failure of Marxism to resonate among Huk 
guerrillas in mountain training camps. The diagnostic and prognostic frame alignment, 
the Japanese occupation must be ended through guerrilla warfare, had high resonance, the 
motivational framing did not. 414  
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Likewise, the Japanese co-prosperity sphere never gained traction among 
the Filipinos. Western colonialism was vaguely condemned, but no specific problem was 
diagnosed. The prognostic and motivational frames were similarly vague, and unable to 
overcome anti-Japanese sentiment.  
b. Agitation Propaganda 
Agitation propaganda teams must be created to circulate the 
underground’’s ideology among the aggrieved population. In doing so, the teams must 
engage the population with the ideology, discuss it, and develop the frame according to 
popular feedback. Mao Tse-Tung wrote and spoke a great deal about the necessity for 
organizers to go among the population and raise consciousness as necessary for 
successful revolution.415 The North Vietnamese agitation propaganda teams also 
practiced this, making a circuit through villages and engaging the rural population in 
active discussion about the National Liberation ’Front’s narrative.416 In addition to 
developing the doctrine, agitation-propaganda teams will also circulate the doctrine 
among sympathetic audiences, reinforcing opinions and commonly held beliefs, and 
contributing to the emergence of collective identity. Mobile propaganda teams were also 
able to support, to a lesser extent, the Hukbalahap movement with Mao’s writings on 
communism and the conduct of guerrilla warfare.417 
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c. Early Cadre 
An indigenous cadre must be formed that is steeped in revolutionary ideals 
and is capable of identifying potential recruits and organizing them into early clandestine 
cells.  
In the first case study, a large supply of cadre were on hand to develop the 
underground. Former Viet Minh guerrillas that had returned to the north when the 
Vietnamese peninsula was divided, as well as former guerrillas that had remained in the 
south were able to begin developing underground structures.418  
In the second case study, the Japanese invasion, and the nature of their 
occupation, obviated the need for great care in developing cadre. Among the Huks and 
the USFIP guerrillas, the underground organization and the guerrilla force formed 
without a cadre developing.419 The USAFFE experience differed greatly; Volckmann and 
Blackburn did not go alone to live among the Igorrot, they were guided there by their 
guide, Bruno, who was from the area. Bruno interpreted for them and aided them in 
making their case for resistance among the tribes.420 
Dedicated single members, or movement entrepreneurs, are a critical 
element in expanding the underground into new regions. In Anheier’s analysis of single 
members in the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, he 
demonstrated that single members embedded themselves into pre-existing social 
networks, recruited those networks, and converted them into party chapter.421 By moving 
cadre into new areas unannounced, there is the possibility of infiltrating existing social 
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networks, converting local leaders, and recruiting broad segments of the population with 
the effort of single members. 
2. Organization 
The early development of the underground is focused upon organizational 
development and agitating the population. In this phase, the first priority is for the 
individual cadre member to create more cadre members. Developing a group of core 
individuals will allow the underground to infiltrate and connect networks, aiding in 
network development, as well as resource mobilization. 
The second priority is to identify and infiltrate existing social networks. Analysis 
of the immediate social topography should be subsequently conducted for future 
infiltration, until a network of networks has been infiltrated and can be subverted to the 
movement’s will. In the absence of existing organizations, mass or popular organizations 
with un-threatening or neutral intentions should be formed in order to organize the local 
population into a resistance coalition. These groups are the pre-cursors to mass 
organizations that will serve as transmission belts, or auxiliary cells, moving future, 
potential cadre deeper into the resistance movement. 
 In her network analysis of resistance organizations in Poland from the 1950s 
through the Solidarity movement, Osa noted that the development of civic oriented 
groups created links between opposing resistance groups. By emphasizing human rights 
and equality and avoiding divisive topics, groups ideologically opposed were able to 
unify to create a large organization. Referred to as neutral brokerage links, these groups 
could keep ideologies from clashing and could facilitate the political left and right 
working in unison. She further noted that the presence of radical organizations acted as 
repression sinks, whereby they would attract the bulk of state attention, and make the 
actual goal of the organization less threatening.422 The principal lesson for the 
unconventional warfare planner is that overt groups may be as important as underground 
groups. In addition to developing robust operational cells, legitimate, overt organizations 
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should be created as well. By creating overt organizations, the underground increases its 
options for action against the state and other networks, and for leveraging resources. 
One of the fundamental challenges of underground movements is the trade-off 
between security and access. Security is paramount, but security without access can 
potentially undermine the popular support, social and logistical, necessary to sustain the 
movement.423 Therefore, organizations must be created that mobilize the portion of the 
population not suited to illicit activity. Overt legitimate organizations and networks are 
formed in the second and third phases in order to organize this portion of the population 
into sympathetic or pro-underground activities. These activities should be legitimate, 
such as legal424 and semi-legal425 services to subversives and cadres or as simple as 
popular education classes.426 In this way, resources are mobilized in a legitimate manner. 
A portion of the population that may have been vulnerable to government reform or 
pacification programs is rendered neutral. Cadres may then use this organization as a 
transmission belt from licit to illicit activity.  
The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) made extensive 
use of Giap’s dictum427 that the entirety of the people be mobilized in People’s war. 
Organizations were created at the village and urban levels that mobilized as many 
different segments of the population as possible, from children as young as six in the 
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Village Children’s Group to the Soldiers Mothers Association. 428 The purpose of these 
groupings was to put every member of society to work for the revolution. The practical 
outcome of this situation is that if you are putting effort into the revolution, Cialdini’s 
principle of commitment and consistency429 will take effect by causing deeper 
commitment to the movement as a result of efforts made on its behalf. 
The Hukbalahap movement made use of the Japanese order to establish 
Neighborhood Associations to establish their primary underground agency, the Barrio 
United Defense Corps.430 This cover gave the underground organization the ability to 
operate overtly as all civilian organization or resource mobilization could be done in the 
name of the neighborhood association. The USAFFE guerrilla organization also engaged 
in subversive organizational politics by infiltrating the Japanese puppet government, 
ultimately frustrating Japanese war efforts.431 While Ramsey would not have realized it, 
this is a play directly out of Lenin’s 1902 pamphlet “What is to be done?” and “Left 
Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder” wherein he directs revolutionaries to infiltrate 
political organizations, form clandestine parallel structures, and subvert the organization. 
By this methodology Lenin claims that the larger puppet organization can be manipulated 
to achieve the ends of elite cadres. Lenin was discussing political parties in resistance to 
standing government rather than infiltrating the actual government, yet this is a clear 
example of the subversive doctrine in action. This is a clear example of the guerrilla force 
increasing participation in political warfare. 
Viet Minh organizational law dictates subversion as the main effort: “Don’t try 
for too much; don’’t smash the existing social system, use it, don’’t destroy opposition 
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organizations, take them over.”432 In the case of the National Front for the Liberation of 
South Vietnam, it was itself a front organization meant to disguise the hand of North 
Vietnamese communist infiltration.433 The underground organizers also made use of 
party members in the South Vietnamese military and civil service for the purpose of 
agitation and subversion.434  
3. Psychological Offensive 
Agitation propaganda teams were Lenin’s answer to the problem of raising 
political consciousness among the masses.435 Giap expanded on this idea by calling for a 
“cadre of faithful ideologues” that would organize and agitate among the targeted 
population.436 Agitation propaganda teams are the work horse of the first three phases of 
underground development. The task of the agitation propaganda team is to introduce 
revolutionary doctrine to the aggrieved population, organize them into rudimentary 
discussion groups, and lead them into cognitive liberation. Numerous agitation-
propaganda teams were trained in North Vietnam and deployed to the south, where they 
would circulate between villages, lecture the villagers on revolution, organize discussion 
groups, and engage the population in critical thinking.437 The Hukbalahap movement 
employed a similar technique, where teams would travel between barrios with news and 
entertainment.438 
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Agitation propaganda teams supplement the published doctrine by circulating 
among groups and communities for three general reasons. First, they must maintain a 
current and accurate understanding of the targeted population; if necessary they adjust 
their message to the population. Secondly, agitation-propagation teams demonstrate that 
the underground is active and gaining in popular strength. Finally, these teams must press 
the population into discussing the doctrine and propaganda of the movement in order to 
begin developing adherents. This process of interaction with the population over the 
doctrine will allow the agitation team to develop their analysis of the doctrines resonance, 
and adjust its centrality or interrelatedness accordingly. 
In the case of the NLF, the emphasis on psychological preparation of the people 
throughout the revolutionary process caused cadre to plan operations and agit-prop work 
psychologically, rather than operations with psychological support to another 
objective.439 Mass organizations were exactly that, a psychological platform for 
gradually indoctrinating and mobilizing everyone. Recognizing that not everyone would 
fit into a youth, women’s, or farmer’s liberation association, special interest organizations 
were created based on census taking of a given area. Ultimately, the goal was to get 
maximum participation and eventual mobilization, not just in fighting but even small 
contributions such as letter writing campaigns in support of propaganda among the 
troops440 or laying out anti-personnel devices as part of a village defense program.441  
In order to create a blank slate, the destruction of the oppression technique of 
removing traditional village leadership in a wave of terror had the effect of disorienting 
the people and blocking support for government reform efforts. It further put villagers in 
a position where they were psychologically dependent upon the party apparatus in the 
village, as it replaced traditional ways of life. As liberation associations gained in 
membership size and participation, they were able to mobilize resources in the form of 
logistical and manpower support for main force operations. As with the gradual vetting 
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and membership process, this shared risk and effort created a collective identity whereby 
participants were able to see themselves as part of a larger effort.  
4. Expansion—Balancing Recruitment and Security 
a. Bloc Recruitment 
Bloc recruitment is the process of recruiting numerous organizations as 
opposed to individuals. Organizations bring with them resources and societal and 
behavioral norms that their members are accustomed to obeying, and transfer that to the 
underground. The pre-existing social and resource mobilizing networks that the recruited 
organization brings will transfer to the underground, allowing the underground to appear 
as if it has always been part of the historical or cultural more. This function is enhanced 
by cadre, or as Anheier calls them, movement entrepreneurs, whose function is to connect 
groups, creating new political alliances, and exploiting opportunity.442 
Auxiliary or mass organizations are used in the expansion phase to 
manage the recruitment of the organizations that were infiltrated or co-opted in the first 
phase. The auxiliary uses the organizations for low risk illicit or semi-illicit tasks and 
screens members for potential for greater tasks, higher in the organization. In this 
manner, the organization operates as a transmission belt, moving members deeper as they 
are individually ready. In South Vietnam villages, there was a dearth of social 
organizations beyond the village or the family unit. In overcoming this obstacle, the NLF 
cadre created associations for the different segments of population. Farmers, for instance, 
joined the Farmer’s Liberation Association, and youth joined the Youth Liberation 
Association.443These associations were generally inclusive, engaged the members in 
local tasks and resource mobilization, and were used to farm potential party members.444 
The Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) in the Philippines served a similar purpose, in 
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a similar manner. The barrio associations that formed in response to landlord repression 
were recruited in bulk into the BUDC, which was used for barrio level underground 
tasks, such as resource mobilization for the guerrilla force. Members of the BUDC were 
moved up as necessary.445 
The popular or mass organizations created in the first and second phase 
likewise have a dual purpose. It is fundamental to the underground that few people are 
simply ‘“ready’” for subversive or otherwise illicit activity. In the Stalinist sense, these 
organizations serve as “transmission belts”446 that identify members that are ready for 
greater involvement. Once identified, members are given increasingly illegal tasks to 
accomplish, and moved deeper into the organization. As they progress, they are sent for 
indoctrination or education in training camps in the rural country or abroad, and in this 
way become not only steeped in the doctrine, but committed to it as well.  
Collective Identities emerge as social networks and organizations share 
risks and otherwise engage in activities supportive to the underground, such as 
demonstrations, or even outright illegal activities such as simple sabotage.447 As the 
collective identity emerges, societal and behavioral norms adjust to the new identity and 
become self-propagating. In this way, recruitment becomes less of a problem and is 
replaced with the problem of identifying members that are ready to move deeper into the 
underground.  
Uniformly in the examples presented in the case of the Philippine 
resistance, the underground developed around communities; either through the residents 
of a barrio establishing a KPMP organization, Don Blackburn’s recruitment of an Ifugao 
tribal community, or ’Fertig’s directive to guerrilla community leaders to form civil 
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governance in President Qezon’s name.448 This situation created four benefits to the 
underground and guerrilla organizations: first, a collective identity emerges in which 
being a part of the resistance is something that a given community does, similar to a 
social norm that promotes communal sharing or mistrust of strangers; second, when a 
collective identity emerges, participation increases as societal norms change; third, block 
recruitment becomes either possible or easier as larger segments of the population 
become a part of the collective identity; finally, security is increased with participation, 
as risk is diffused when the dangers of illicit participation are shared by many. 
b. Doctrine 
Indoctrinating members at all levels, commensurate with their 
involvement, brings its own security. Members and underground “tourists” alike are more 
likely to be influenced in favor of the underground to the degree that they are exposed to 
indoctrination.449 A supportive tendency will develop relative to the personal effort they 
have expended discussing the doctrine and goals of the underground movement.  
The risk of illicit activity is spread among numerous people as the 
organization grows. Illegal or questionable tasks broken into many small parts reduce the 
risk of life changing prosecution to the individual, increasing the likelihood of 
participation. This further aids in the development of collective identity as many take a 
small part in a wholly illegal operation. In village associations in Vietnam, villagers were 
given numerous small tasks such as laying out anti-personnel traps, caching small arms 
and medical supplies, and so forth.450 The net result of all of these small tasks was that 
policing areas became increasingly difficult for the state, and the guerrilla operations 
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were facilitated. In the Philippines, the use of spotters and runners to relay information to 
other points of information relay reduced the amount of time that an individual was 
exposed to risk.451 
Finally, the cellular organization of the underground provides its greatest 
insurance against state repression. All intelligence, operational, auxiliary, and 
manufactory cells are broken down into their prime functions. Those functions are 
separated by an intermediary of some sort, breaking the cells down and leaving the 
network, as a whole, unknown to any one member.  
B. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
Developing the underground in a resistance is an immense topic with an equally 
immense body of literature. While this thesis does ascertain the best practices for 
developing an underground organization, it does not delve deep into any one of those 
practices. The best practices discussed, such as agitation propaganda or political warfare, 
are topics that have significant bodies of literature. Future research should review the  
employment of agitation propaganda as a method of psychological support to 
unconventional warfare. Particularly in case studies that demonstrate a movement 
sponsored by a foreign power that are successful without the emergence of a guerrilla 
force, such as the Polish Resistance Movement or Operation Ajax, the 1953 coup in Iran 
that restored the Shah to power.452 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT  
The seven doctrinal phases of unconventional warfare begin with psychological 
preparation of the people for resistance.453The Military Information Support community 
should become the proponent for the first phase and ‘“left of beginning’” or phase zero 
activities. A doctrine dealing with the psychological preparation of the people must be 
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developed that outlines the early activities noted in this study. Finally, a training program 
for must be created for the purpose of preparing organizers of subversion. 
The seven phased approach to the problem of unconventional warfare is adequate 
to supporting an existing guerrilla force with training and equipment. It is not sufficient, 
however, for creating an underground movement capable of welding existing social and 
political movements into resistance. In developing a doctrine for the psychological 
preparation of the people, Molnar’s five phases of underground development should be a 
subset of the first phase of unconventional warfare. Adding this underground foundation 
to the doctrine would provide an ideological base for creating a mission essential task list 
for subversive organizers; a piece of training literature that does not currently exist. 
The existing body of individual tasks in Military Information Support doctrine 
includes tactical and planning tasks in support of operations, information development 
and dissemination tasks, and foreign internal defense tasks. 454 This list prepares the 
information specialist to analyze a given demographic, produce a message tailored to it, 
and deliver the same, in support of larger operations. It also provides training guidance 
for preparing the information specialist to train a host nation force in the same tasks. For 
the branch to undertake psychological preparation, and subsequent organization, of a 
given population for resistance, training doctrine must prepare the operator for 
conducting independent operations among the population. Tasks that might be included, 
based off the findings of this study, include organizational design, network mapping, 
agitation propaganda tasks, intelligence analysis, and managing information sources. 
Future study in this field should include analysis of historical agitation propaganda 
techniques to develop such a list. 
In areas designated as potential sites for unconventional warfare, the “left of 
beginning” activities must begin as early as possible. To that end, a replication of the 
current system of regional foreign internal defense work should be created wherein 
subversive operators embed themselves in innocuous social networks using the pretext of 
language immersion or higher education programs. In this capacity, the embedded 
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operator could constantly evaluate and catalogue potential grievances and existing 
networks. This would provide a menu of options for redirecting networks in the event 
that conducting underground activities becomes desirable. 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Current special operations doctrine for unconventional warfare focuses on 
infiltrating Special Forces support into an existing movement for the purpose of creating 
a better guerrilla force. Organizational development and psychological warfare are briefly 
discussed as items that should support the guerrilla force, but not with any depth. This 
leaves the Civil Affairs or Military Information Support planners and operators without a 
guideline to refer to, and creates a situation wherein planning and operations rely upon 
the bright ideas from individuals. The purpose in reviewing the development of the 
underground for “best organizational practices” is to supplement the doctrine by 
providing a mission essential task list to the unconventional warfare practitioner. The 
lessons learned from the case studies are particularly relevant to the early phases of 
developing an indigenous resistance movement. 
The case studies used in this thesis highlight a potential methodology for 
constructing an underground movement. When that methodology is examined in terms of 
social movement theory a play book begins to emerge from which templates might be 
applied in support of a given policy objective. Regardless of the policy objective or the 
scope of the desired movement, a number of ‘“musts’” on the operator’s checklist must 
be considered to start even a modest resistance movement to influence or disrupt regimes. 
First, before any organization is engaged or any doctrine developed, the operator must 
undertake to conduct a census of the area of operations. Even a rudimentary census 
should reveal what social networks are active, and of those which are likely to be 
friendly, hostile, or indifferent to social movement; a census should also reveal which 
movements are accessible for an organizer to embed. Second, organizers must monitor 
existing grievances and social networks, and continue to develop the census. Third, a 
doctrine must be developed around which to recruit a cadre of movement entrepreneurs. 
Fourth, where needed, a party or committee must be organized to steer the movement into 
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acceptable directions. Fifth, movement entrepreneurs should establish supporting 
committees that perform basic unconventional warfare functions, such as psychological 
operations, political action committees, and so forth. These committees should be headed 
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